

25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS**

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

**SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE
UNITED STATES**

JUNE 8, 11, AND 29, 1956

PART 29

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SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

FRIDAY, JUNE 8, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:30 a. m., in room 457, Senate Office Building, Senator John Marshall Butler presiding.

Present: Senator Butler.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel; Benjamin Mandel, research director; and F. W. Schroeder, chief investigator.

Senator BUTLER. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Will Mr. Bialer and Mr. Jan Karski come forward, please?

Mr. Karski, will you stand first, please?

Senator BUTLER. Will you raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that you will interpret to the witness the questions directed to him and you will truly interpret the answers given by the witness to the best of your ability, so help you God?

Mr. KARSKI. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your full name and address to the reporter?

Mr. KARSKI. My name is Jan Karski, professor, Georgetown University.

Mr. MORRIS. That is in Washington, D. C.?

Mr. JAN KARSKI. Washington, D. C.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, will you stand, please?

Senator BUTLER. Do you solemnly swear in the presence of Almighty God that the evidence you are about to give to this subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

(The oath was interpreted to the witness.)

(The witness spoke in Polish.)

The INTERPRETER. I do.

Senator BUTLER. The witness is sworn. Counsel will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF SEWERYN BIALER, WASHINGTON, D. C., AS INTERPRETED BY JAN KARSKI

Mr. MORRIS. Will you give your full name and address to the reporter?

The INTERPRETER. Seweryn Bialer.

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Mr. MORRIS. And you reside now in Washington, D. C., do you not?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. When did you come to the United States?

The INTERPRETER. May the 4th, 1956.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you an official of the Polish Communist Government?

The INTERPRETER. Until 1951, I was employed by the Polish Government in Poland. After 1951, I was assigned to the Polish Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. And when did you leave the Polish Communist Party?

The INTERPRETER. The 31st of January 1956.

Mr. MORRIS. What happened on that occasion?

The INTERPRETER. I passed from East Berlin to West Berlin on that day.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you at that time defect from the Polish Communist Government?

The INTERPRETER. I left Poland in the middle of January. I went to East Berlin and then I left East Berlin for the West. And I was a member of the official Polish delegation to East Berlin.

Senator BUTLER. Will you ask him what his duties were with the Polish Government?

The INTERPRETER. Until 1951 I had leading political positions in the Polish militia.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what they were?

The INTERPRETER. My last position was the Chief of the Political Division of the Headquarters of the Polish Militia.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us why you made your decision to defect on January 31, 1956?

The INTERPRETER. I came to a firm conclusion that all this that I was doing for the long 15 years was unjust, bad, and I wanted to break relations with all this.

Mr. MORRIS. You say it was unjust and bad?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Was there anything more you would like to tell us about your decision to defect?

The INTERPRETER. I would tell you there are four main reasons for my decision. The first one is the political reason. I came to a conclusion, on the basis as an eyewitness, that the Communist system is contrary to all rules of democracy. The second reason was an economic reason. From the economic point of view, I could see that the system is contrary to economic justice.

There was also a moral reason. Communist morality is contrary to human nature, and I came to that conclusion.

And then came also ideological reasons. I saw that the Communist theory and Communist practice do not go together, that the practice defies the theory, and I saw it.

It means that the theory does not agree with the facts.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you could tell us, Mr. Bialer, whether those are the four elements that prompted you to defect.

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would tell us what positions you had in the Polish Communist Party dating down to January 31, 1956.

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The INTERPRETER. I was employed by the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party in the propaganda division.

In that propaganda division I was one of the chiefs of the anti-Western and anti-American propaganda.

I was also a lecturer for the Central Committee.

I was the first secretary in the party organization to the two most important Communist schools in Poland.

I was also an ideological adviser to the official leading Communist paper in Poland, the People's Tribune.

I also contributed to other papers in Poland.

I was also a professor of the Institute of Social Sciences at the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and also I worked as a research worker in the Institute of Economic Sciences of the Polish Academy of Science.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if you would tell us briefly how you carried on the campaign of propaganda against the West, and particularly against the United States.

The INTERPRETER. There were many ways. The first one: I wrote articles on different subjects. Secondly, I delivered very, very many lectures in Poland. Thousands of people were listening to me.

Then I was the author of instructions to the party workers, how should they carry on anti-American and anti-Western propaganda in Poland.

From time to time I had meetings with the Communists from other countries behind the Iron Curtain. We exchanged views, and also I would give them advice as to how carry on this type of propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Bialer, have you prepared a summary of your experiences in Poland for the purposes of giving advice on the psychological warfare campaign for the Free Europe Committee?

The INTERPRETER. You have in mind, sir, this document you have in your hand?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; The Declaration of a Former Communist.

The INTERPRETER. I wrote it in Polish.

Mr. MORRIS. You wrote it in Polish?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And it has been translated into English?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And you prepared this particularly on psychological warfare; is that right?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Did you do that on behalf of the Free Europe Committee?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

May I smoke?

Mr. MORRIS. Pardon?

The INTERPRETER. May I smoke?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes, by all means.

And this was prepared, then, during the month of May, was it not?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Since you arrived in the United States?

Now, are all the statements in there truthful statements?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to put in the record of this subcommittee this paper entitled "The Declaration of a Former Communist," with the identification made by the witness, written for the purpose he has described here this morning.

I would like that to go into our record in its entirety, Senator. Senator BUTLER. It will be made a part of the record.

Mr. MORRIS. And there is, Senator, as you will notice a biographical sketch which composes the first page of this declaration.

Senator BUTLER. That will be made a part of the record.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 286," and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 286

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF SEWERYN BIALER

Born: November 3, 1926.

1942: joined the underground anti-Nazi Communist organization in Lodz.

July 1944-May 1945: inmate of Auschwitz and Friedland concentration camps.

May 1945-June 1951:

Chief of the Political Department of the training center of the Citizens' Militia at Slupsk.

Chief of the Political Department of the Central Command of the Citizens' Militia in Warsaw.

Other executive political positions in the Citizens' Militia.

June 1951-January 31, 1956:

A Party activist of the Central Committee of the PZPR.

Worked in the propaganda department of the Central Committee of the PZPR.

Lecturer of the Central Committee of the PZPR.

Secretary of the Party Committee in the Institute of Social Sciences and the Higher School of Marxism-Leninism affiliated with the Central Committee of the PZPR.

Ideological advisor to Trybuna Ludu, the General Party organ.

Editor of Zeszyty Teoretyczno-Polityczne.

Contributor to Nowe Drogi, Trybuna, Ludu, Ekonomista, and other Party and professional publications.

Research scholar for the School of Economic Sciences, affiliated with the Polish Academy of Sciences.

Coauthor of Party training textbook and other Party publications.

Member of the delegation of the Central Committee of the PZPR to Moscow, Leningrad, East Berlin, and other cities.

Delegate from Poland to the Youth Congress in Bucharest.

Holder of a number of high Polish decorations and orders of merit.

THE DECLARATION OF A FORMER COMMUNIST

At the end of January last when I was breaking with Communism once and for all, and crossing the border into West Berlin, I knew that I was wiping out my past life. I took this step with my eyes open, however, after carefully deliberating for several months.

I was 15 in 1942 when I enrolled in the Communist underground organization in Lodz. I was trained by the Party and trained others to be loyal to it. Several thousand PZPR activists in Warsaw, Lodz, Wroclaw, Bydgoszcz, Kielce, and other cities know me from the lectures and briefings I held as a lecturer appointed by the Central Committee of the Party. Readers of Party publications also know me well from my articles. My colleagues at the Social Science Institute and the Central Committee's school of Marxism-Leninism—where I was Secretary of the Party authorities—also know me well. I am known to Party members from various other institutions and scholarly positions, as well as propaganda posts with which I was associated. I owe all of these people an explanation: Why did I break with the Party? Why did I stop believing in Communism?

The Communist System Is Antidemocratic

They know perfectly well that I did not escape to the West to secure a job or to make a career because all this was secured for me by the Party, and open to me in Poland.

Shortly after the war, at the age of 19, I became head of the Political Department at the Citizens' Militia Training Center and after that I advanced swiftly. When I was leaving Poland, I belonged to the Central Committee Party *aktiv* and the Party leadership had complete trust in me. As a result of the duties I was charged with and the posts I occupied, I had access to materials, facts, and documents which are often inaccessible to the majority of Party activists, not to speak of the rank and file and the general public. As a result, I could gradually acquaint myself with the truth and more and more discover the fraudulence and the evil. For a very long time I thought that poverty, waste, terror, and falsehood were the inevitable price every revolution has to pay for progress. Having been for many years active in the Party I was thoroughly familiar with its working methods, its system of government, and I arrived at the conclusion that it was an antidemocratic system which could not exist without poverty, waste, and falsehood.

The Dictator Died but the Dictatorship Remains

Why did this change of attitude toward Communism take place in me during the last, post-Stalin period? Because I saw them with a particular intensity and became convinced that the evil connected with Communism does not arise from individual mistakes, but from the Communist system itself. The dictator's death had to bring about certain changes in the shape of the dictatorship, both in Russia and in the captive countries. However, as I learned from the experience of the past three years in Poland, that did not mean the disappearance of the dictatorship itself. *The Membership of the Politburo has changed, and perhaps will continue to change, but its omnipotence has remained*, as has the symbol of its power and dictatorship, the First Secretary of the Central Committee, Edward Ochab, who took Bierut's place after his death, and is notorious for the brutal Stalinist methods he uses.

I was particularly struck by the fact that the same people who blamed Stalin and Beria for everything bad simultaneously practiced the use of the same Stalinist and Beria-like methods as much as they could. What is more, when it is deemed necessary, they restore these methods, fighting openly and secretly against any pronounced attempts at the democratization of Party and national life.

I shall give you at least one example. At the end of 1952, at the Politburo office, I was shown a letter which the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had written to Soviet Party activists explaining the way Beria had been liquidated. One of the reasons for the Beria purge was his alleged attempt to get into contact with Tito and the Yugoslav Party. A year later, the same Khrushchev who had signed the above-mentioned letter to the Party activists, went to Belgrade to win Marshal Tito over and to ask his forgiveness, making Beria responsible then for Tito's excommunication. It told me that Khrushchev and company were fighting for power against their antagonists by the same methods Stalin had used, though externally their methods might seem different. I also ascertained irrefutably that the Party leadership continued to disclose and condemn only those crimes and dark pages of Communist history which could not be kept secret, or which had to be disclosed because it was necessary for the leadership. They continued to treat the rank and file of the Party, not to mention the people at large, as an object of their rule, and to suppress the truth about the many internal events in the Party, and most of the problems discussed by its leaders. How can one explain otherwise the paradoxical fact that the resolutions of the III Plenum were not published, though the Plenum was allegedly an epoch-making event aimed at the democratization and gradual revelation of Party activities in Poland?

The Party Leadership Fears the Progress of the Thaw

As an activist and employee of the Central Committee, I took part in the debates in the Central Party *aktiv*. I had access to many documents and I know the way comrades from the Politburo tried to smother and suppress the so-called "thaw" because they were panic-stricken by its results. I also know what a farce Rokzanski and his comrades' trial was. I know how passionately Berman, Bierut, Ochab, and others shielded, as long as they could, Beria's successors in

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Poland—Radkiewicz, for example—and how they tried to make them suffer as little as possible.

For several years I was particularly closely connected with the ideological work of the Party. In this work I was in touch with the leading Marxists in Russia and the Soviet bloc countries. I devoted many years to the study of Marxist-Leninist ideology and finally concluded that in the Communist version of it, real freedom of scientific research is impossible. The repudiation of some of the theoretical theses formulated by Stalin by the present Russian Communist leaders does not change anything because the head of the Party continues to be the highest and virtually infallible scientific oracle in all matters of economics, philosophy, history, agronomy, and many other branches of knowledge. (Stalin's place has now been taken by that noteworthy personality, from the intellectual and scholarly point of view, Nikita Sergeyevitch Khrushchev, called Nikita Kukuruznik by the Party activists themselves.)

The fact that in 1955, long after the old tyrant's death, during the rule of the new and allegedly democratic party authorities in Russia, a ban was placed on discussion of the main problem of economic policy, I mean the problem of the relation between development of heavy industrial production and consumer goods production, in Russia and all the captive countries. Fearing that we might discuss these problems, we, the workers of the Party's ideological front and intellectual activists, were instructed to limit ourselves to writing essays which would merely explain the official Party line on the priority development of heavy industry.

Facts Are Against Communism

One of my Party assignments was to prepare guidances for the propaganda policy aimed at the West. I had, therefore, access to materials, facts, and statistics which are carefully kept secret from the Party and the general public. On the basis of those materials I became convinced that both Communist theory and practice are false because they are contradicted by the facts. They are contradicted by the improvement of the situation of the working classes in the West, and by the poverty in the Communist countries. Taking part in the work of various institutions and in various scholarly posts, I was able to acquaint myself with the methods of falsification, embellishment, and suppression of data and statistics concerning the standard of living in Poland, and with the methods of garbling Western statistics for Communist propaganda purposes.

Step by step I learned the truth and lost faith in Communism. I had to lie, pretend, and play a double game. Finally, I arrived at the conclusion that I was unable to live that way any longer, that it was better to erase 15 years of wasted life than to continue to live without faith that what I was doing was right.

These are the reasons I broke with Communism. That is why I gave up brilliant prospects in the Party and took the decisive step which was so difficult for personal reasons. That is why I crossed the Western border, so that I could freely and openly tell what I know about the facts the Communist leadership tries to suppress, so that I can tell what I know about Communist theory and practice.

* * * * *

BERIA'S CASE

In March 1953, greatly impressed by Stalin's death, I listened together with other Party members to the speeches that Beria, Malenkov, and Molotov gave in Moscow's Red Square. They all spoke of the inflexible unity of the Party leadership and promised to guard that leadership unity constantly. I believed them then and listened to their speeches with great emotion.

However, before four months had elapsed, I was taken aback by the communique about Beria's arrest and next about his purge. The official explanation in the press filled me with serious doubts.

In the autumn of 1953, at the office of the PZPR Politburo, I was given a secret letter from the Soviet Party Presidium to the Party *aktiv* in Russia. The letter explained the reasons that made Beria's purge necessary. Besides myself, some other chosen members of the Central Party *aktiv* were allowed to read the letter. Afterwards, it was probably returned to the PZPR Politburo's safe where it probably still lies under Ochab's vigilant eye.

I read this letter with great interest. I had no illusions whatsoever as to Beria's role as Security Police chief. On the other hand, I realized that many

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official reasons for his liquidation had been invented and *did not apply exclusively to him*. That's why I was curious about whether in a letter reserved for a small group of the most trusted comrades I would find some explanation for my doubts. However, the contents of the letter, instead of dispelling my doubts, increased them even further. The letter repeated many of the charges I knew from the communique in the newspapers. Thus, Beria was accused of having transformed the security apparatus into an organ independent of the Party. There was also the same charge about Beria's mistakes in his nationalities policy, especially with respect to the small nations in the Soviet Union. Even the absurd charge about Beria's having been a spy and an imperialist agent, recruited in 1918, was repeated.

Beria Surrounds Other Politburo Members with Spies

In addition to those well-known charges, there were other accusations. Thus, Beria was accused of using the security apparatus in the struggle for power within the Soviet Politburo. I remember that this charge was corroborated, among other things, by the fact that Beria had seized control of the Kremlin guards and with their help had organized surveillance and wiretapping of the conversations of the other Politburo members. The second fact quoted in the letter was even more typical. It was maintained that when one of the Politburo members was leaving for Lwow, Beria summoned the head of the NKVD in Lwow and ordered him to put the member under surveillance in Lwow. When the head of the Lwow NKVD expressed his surprise that such an order could be issued about a Politburo member, Beria reminded him what refusal to execute his order would entail, and said—I remember the phrase very clearly: "If you don't carry out my orders, I shall crush you into labor camp dust." In spite of that, the NKVD agent from Lwow was so shocked that he immediately called upon other Politburo members to tell them about Beria's order.

Other charges in the letter referred to economic matters. They were very numerous and I want to mention them here only briefly. Among other things, Beria was accused of having hampered the development of agriculture by his influence in the Politburo. Besides, Beria was also accused of having consistently hindered the policy of raising the standard of living of the working classes by opposing any lowering of prices.

The Amoral Profile of Beria

The Soviet Politburo letter also said that Beria was a moral degenerate in his private life. As proof, the following facts were listed. It was maintained that Beria had a special apartment in Moscow where he organized erotic orgies in selected company. On his orders, specially chosen women were brought from the Moscow prisons. According to the letter, these women were later liquidated in labor camps. Beria also forced other women he liked to take part in those orgies. When he grew bored with them, they were arrested and sent to special labor camps.

The letter also said that Beria had appropriated authorship of the book called *The History of the Bolshevik Organization in Transcaucasia*, whose authors he had shot. According to the letter, the book contained many historical falsehoods which exaggerated Beria's role. This charge was particularly interesting to me because Beria's book was one of the official manuals of the history of the Bolshevik Party used in the Party training which I myself had organized in Poland.

Nor did the list of charges end there. The letter maintained that Beria had persecuted the family of the dead Party leader Ordjonikidze because he had been one of the first to suspect Beria and to mistrust him. After Ordjonikidze's death, Beria transferred his hatred to his family, persecuting and destroying it.

Who Performed the Murders in Leningrad?

From the letter on Beria I also learned for the first time officially about the so-called Leningrad Affair. The Politburo accused Beria of having conducted a policy of liquidation of people devoted and loyal to the Communist Party simply because they were devoted and loyal. The "Leningrad Affair" was an example where in a series of secret trials, the flower of the political *aktiv* of Leningrad was liquidated. According to the letter, the material evidence in those trials had been fabricated by Beria.

It is very possible that Beria was actually one of the men who organized the Leningrad trials. But I understood the perfidy of this accusation only later, in February 1955, when I read another Politburo letter explaining Malenkov's dismissal. In that letter, I found, among other things, a charge that Malenkov was

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also responsible for the organization of the Leningrad trials. I then came to the conclusion that Khrushchev, aiming at seizure of power in the Party, had adopted the tactics of removing his rivals one by one. As long as it was necessary, he, together with Malenkov, accused Beria of staging the Leningrad trials. Eighteen months later, when Malenkov's turn came, Khrushchev made him coresponsible.

Beria Wanted, but Khrushchev Went . . .

The most perfidious charges in the letter, against the background of the present Party line, were the charges that the proof of Beria's work as an imperialist agent was in his attempts after Stalin's death to get in touch with Tito and the Yugoslav Party. According to the Politburo letter, the Yugoslav Party was a fascist and anti-Soviet Party. I even remember a certain detail in connection with that charge. Beria was accused of having tried to make direct telephone contact with Belgrade for private talks with the Yugoslav leaders. The question was about reopening a direct telephone line which had been cut off between the Kremlin and Belgrade after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform.

The perfidy of this charge appeared to me only much later. When Khrushchev went to Belgrade and when the new Politburo policy toward Yugoslavia was announced, I remembered that part of the letter which had accused Beria of trying to establish relations with a fascist and anti-Soviet Yugoslav Party. *On one hand, Khrushchev blamed Beria for having broken off relations with Tito and Yugoslavia and, on the other, he accused him and indicted him for having attempted to reestablish those relations.*

At the end of the letter, the Soviet Politburo asked the question: "Why was Beria so rapidly unmasked after Stalin's death?" The letter gave the following answer: the Soviet Politburo could unmask him so soon because Beria became domineering and reckless after Stalin's death. He made careless moves and thus enabled the Politburo to unmask him as an imperialist agent. In this way the Soviet Politburo gave one to understand that before Stalin's death it had not known of Beria's criminal activities, but it had discovered them only in the past two or three months and therefore was not responsible for Beria's past activities.

Further the letter explained that in investigating Beria's hostile activities and in its fight against him, the Politburo had to be very careful since any rash step would have aroused his suspicions. While being aware of Beria's criminal activities, the Politburo had to pretend that it did not suspect him of anything. Because of this, it had to accept certain of Beria's moves though it did not agree with them. The letter gives as an example the question of the policy line preceding the Berlin riots in June 1953. In it, the Soviet Politburo declared that the policy imposed by Beria on the Soviet authorities in East Germany, and on the political leadership of the German Democratic Republic, which resulted in the June riots, was false. The Soviet Politburo was aware of the fact that the policy being conducted in East Germany was in error, but could not oppose it because it did not want Beria to guess that he was suspected of being a spy.

Khrushchev Uses Stalin's and Beria's Methods

Such were the contents of the secret letter of the Presidium of the CPSU to the political *aktiv* in Russia. This letter was one of the documents which helped to evaluate the situation properly. Not immediately, of course, but later, when I compared other Khrushchev moves with the letter's charges about Beria, I became profoundly convinced that both the secret trial and the fabrication of certain of the charges in Beria's purge were typical of the methods both Stalin and Beria had applied. And the responsibility for those methods could not be fixed only on Beria or Stalin. After the letter about Malenkov, after Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade, and after the July Plenum last year, it became clear to me that in large measure Khrushchev was fighting for power with the same methods as Beria and Stalin had used. I also came to the conclusion that there was no difference between the trials organized by Stalin and Beria, and Beria's trial, insofar as trumping up charges or in the methods of conducting the trial itself.

* * * * *
MALENKOV FORCED TO RESIGN: KHRUSHCHEV DEGRADES MALENKOV

After Beria's purge the next step in the power struggle inside the Soviet Politburo was Malenkov's forced resignation. Before it happened we had a period of awakened hopes. After the Beria affair, some changes were introduced into

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the Party leadership system. *The question of the improvement of the standard of living was considered the most important task.* I must state that in 1954 I myself and a considerable number of the Party activists really believed that the power struggle in the Soviet Politburo was over. We believed that after Beria's removal, the highest Soviet leadership was united.

Yet, in February 1955, the news of Malenkov's removal came like a thunder-clap. It shocked the entire Party *aktiv*: we knew immediately that the struggle in the Politburo continued. We were indignant at the way in which Malenkov had been removed, rather like a schoolboy, and not like the Premier of a great country which was considered as a model democracy. Finally, we thought that the official reasons for Malenkov's dismissal in which we were asked to believe, and which we were asked to tell others, were ridiculous.

Bierut and Ochab Said Only One Thing: Obey the Moscow Politburo

We turned for an answer to our doubt to the PZPR leadership, to Bierut, Berman, and Ochab. They had only one answer for us, however: we must trust the Soviet Party Presidium completely. Moreover, they attempted to cut short all discussion of the subject. I remember, for example, that in February 1955, at one of the Party meetings at the Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Party Committee, I was sitting next to Berman and expressed my doubts about Malenkov's resignation. Berman answered with phrases about full confidence, and greatly agitated cut off further discussion.

When, shortly thereafter, at the Politburo office, I was given a Soviet Communist Party Presidium letter to the Soviet Party *aktiv*, concerning Malenkov this time, I wondered whether I would find an answer there to the questions that haunted me—and I found it.

Because up to today, the reasons for Malenkov's removal have not been given to the Russian people, or to the Party, or to the Polish people, I would like to tell about the contents of that letter. These are the reasons mentioned in the confidential letter, not those given in the press, which were so absurd that no one could believe them. I shall enumerate them one by one.

The Main Emphasis Was Not Farming and the Farmer's Life, but Power

The first charge concerned Malenkov's responsibility for serious errors in his farm policy. This accusation was already known to me from Malenkov's statement explaining his resignation. In the Soviet Politburo letter the charge was amplified. It was said that Malenkov was in charge of farm policy. The state of farming in the Soviet Union was alarming, and Malenkov was chiefly responsible for this state of affairs.

When I read those charges, the following questions came to my mind. First, if Malenkov were responsible for the farm crisis, what could we say about Khrushchev who had for many years been Party Secretary in the Ukraine, the granary of the Soviet Union? Secondly, if Malenkov knew so little about agriculture, what could be said about his successor, Bulganin, who, as I learned from his biography, had never had anything to do with farming? Thirdly, if Malenkov were little acquainted with agriculture, he knew even less about electric power stations, and yet in spite of it, he had been appointed minister of electric power stations. Finally, the first steps which, in the opinion of Khrushchev and the entire Politburo, were to change the farm situation completely had already been taken under Malenkov. Therefore, it was not Malenkov who was preventing implementation of agrarian reforms. Consequently, the question of farming was not involved. My suspicion was subsequently confirmed when, in spite of Malenkov's resignation, no really new resolutions on farm questions were announced.

What also struck me was that Beria was also accused of being responsible for the farm crisis. This coincidence of charges being brought against Beria and Malenkov became even more striking when I read the rest of the letter. I shall write of it later in connection with the coresponsibility for the "Leningrad Affair."

Light Industry—No!

Before coming to that matter, I should like to mention other charges brought against Malenkov in the Soviet Politburo's confidential letter. Attention was drawn to the danger caused by Malenkov's policy to the regular development of the People's Democracies. This charge was formulated cautiously, and like the entire letter, briefly. Such a policy, as conducted by Malenkov, could bring about a decrease of economic effort in the People's Democracies. I understood

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then immediately what it was all about. At that time, there was great interest in the Polish Party in the developments in Hungary after Imre Nagy had come to power. During that period, Hungary abandoned the principle of stressing heavy industry at any price and by any means. Not only I, but many other people, saw in it a great relief for the Hungarian people. During this period, pressure was brought to bear on the Party leadership in Poland by the *aktiv* to follow the Hungarian example more resolutely in establishing the relation between heavy industry and consumer goods production so that the standard of living could be raised.

This pressure was firmly resisted by the Party leadership. They were at that time greatly displeased by the Hungarian comrades who were making the situation in Poland more difficult. I remember especially well that Szyr was furious when some of the activists maintained that Hungarian economic policy was more sensible than Polish.

Shortly after Malenkov's removal, even before I had occasion to read the Soviet Politburo's letter, I learned about Imre Nagy's dismissal and that is why, when I read in the letter that Malenkov had been accused of endangering the orderly development of the People's Democracies, I understood how this charge was justified from the Soviet Politburo viewpoint. Malenkov had, in fact, conducted a policy which might have brought some measure of relief in the economic situations of the captive countries. In the long run, however, this would mean an increase in the independence of those countries and with such a policy, Khrushchev and the rest of the Politburo could not agree. Besides, during Khrushchev's stay in Poland in the spring of 1955, I could personally ascertain it from listening to his very aggressive and unpublished speeches.

The next charge in the letter concerned Malenkov's incorrect attitude toward developing heavy industry, which was closely connected with what I have said before. When I read the Soviet Politburo's letter, I was struck by the fact that Malenkov was actually accused of deviation from Stalinism, for one of Stalin's fundamental economic principles was priority of heavy industry and maintenance of a steady difference of tempo between heavy industrial and consumer goods industry development. The simple conclusion occurred to me that whatever is convenient in Stalinism to the present Party leadership will, without fail, be maintained. I also remember that during that time there were numerous discussions of economic policy, of the ratio between heavy industry and consumer goods industry, in the Party, and after Malenkov's dismissal, these discussions were severely forbidden.

And so Malenkov's Turn Came. Who Next?

Finally, there was yet another charge which gave me much to think about in that confidential letter. The Soviet Politburo accused Malenkov of a conciliatory attitude toward Beria and of coreponsibility for the "Leningrad trials." The charge was formulated as follows: during the period of struggle against Beria, Malenkov adopted a conciliatory attitude toward him and was, moreover, coreponsible for the "Leningrad Affair." I noted immediately that this charge was identical with one of the charges made against Beria, though formulated in a less emphatic way, the charges on which the purge of Beria had been based. Yet, I thought, Malenkov had been Khrushchev's aide when Beria was purged. Still another question occurred to me. Why wasn't Malenkov accused of it in those days. The answer was clear enough. Malenkov was indispensable in the fight against Beria, and his turn had not yet come.

In this way the "Leningrad Affair" and the crisis in agriculture were exploited by Khrushchev twice in order to rid himself of his two most important rivals. This tested method of removal was applied by Khrushchev, as I was to learn later, with great success. When Molotov was removed in July, I remembered that at the same session of the Supreme Soviet at which Malenkov had been forced to resign, Molotov had given a speech on foreign policy. In that speech, he had expressed the same views on the Yugoslav problem as those for which he was later severely criticized at the July Plenum. He had also then formulated the same thesis with respect to the stage of development of communism in Russia which he was publicly asked to withdraw.

But Molotov's mistakes were tolerated by Khrushchev at that time. The reason was obvious: Molotov's help was necessary to force Malenkov's resignation. In February, Molotov was still indispensable to Khrushchev, as Malenkov had been indispensable during the purge of Beria in July 1953. Molotov's turn came at the July Plenum last year. . . .

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HOW KHRUSHCHEV CARRIED OUT MOLOTOV'S POLITICAL DEMOTION

The third step in Khrushchev's showdown with his Politburo rival was to remove Molotov from all influence on political affairs in the Party leadership. This took place last July at the Plenum. How did it come about?

In July 1955 the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was held. The materials connected with the Plenum filled the Soviet and Polish press for several days; they were the subject of discussions and official training in the PZPR. The subject discussed at the Plenum, at least what one could judge from the materials, was the question of introducing new technical methods into Soviet industry. Bulganin made a speech. I remember I considered a positive thing that all the speeches of the participants had been published, a rare thing at Russian plena and even at Polish ones. The discussion was not secret and in many cases was very lively.

True, I found it odd that in view of such important events in the international arena as Khrushchev's and Bulganin's visit to Belgrade, the Austrian problem, and the Geneva Conference, no foreign policy problems were discussed at the Plenum. However, I did not attach great importance to it. It did not occur to me that so early after Malenkov's removal, new personal showdowns were in the making. Besides, it was a period of intensification of the "thaw" in Poland, and these problems occupied my attention completely.

Three months passed and the questions connected with the July Plenum were slowly forgotten. The problems of the Plenum ceased to be discussed at training centers. But in October Bierut suddenly called a meeting of the members of the Central Committee, and a part of the Central Party *aktiv*. When we gathered on the 6th floor of the building of the Central Committee, Bierut got up and told us that the July Plenum *besides its public part had had a secret and unpublished part*. In a short talk Bierut informed us of some of the matters which had been discussed in the secret part of the July Plenum. Our meeting was strictly confidential. I remember Bierut told us that we could not make notes.

Bierut's brief information was later passed on, even more briefly, to certain groups of the Party *aktiv* in Warsaw, and Jerzy Morawski reported on the secret part of the Plenum to the lecturers of the Central Committee. For my part, I made a report on those matters to Party schools and again it was understood that no notes could be taken. Also, attendance at the meeting was closely checked on the basis of a list and Party identity cards. No questions or discussion were permitted; in short, the material was treated as strictly confidential. But it all became clear to me when I read a stenographic record of the secret part of the Plenum.

A few days after the meeting with Bierut in the Politburo office, they gave me the full stenographic record of the July Plenum to read. It was the only copy sent to Poland for the use of the Polish Politburo. Only a very small number of the members of the Party *aktiv* were permitted to read it. The record was very long. The Plenum had lasted 8 days and some of the speeches several hours, so I shall only deal with some of the problems discussed at the Plenum.

The Third Step in the Career of the Collective Leadership: Khrushchev

What was the chief subject of the secret part of the July Plenum? After reading the record carefully I saw that it concerned itself chiefly with the showdown between Khrushchev and the rest of the Soviet Politburo on one hand, and Molotov on the other. The secret part of the July Plenum was, therefore, the third step in clearing the way for the so-called collective leadership, therefore, for Khrushchev.

What was the platform of this showdown? The Yugoslav issue. The problem of the attitude of the Soviet Communist Party toward Marshal Tito and the Yugoslav Party. But it would not be fair to restrict the discussion to Tito's case. The fact is that the question of Yugoslav relations was only a point of departure for a long discussion of political and economic problems. I shall enumerate only the most important ones.

A good deal of space was given to a discussion of coexistence with the capitalist countries, to the problem of political relations between the Russian Party and the Parties of the People's Democracies, to the problem of diplomatic relations with the People's Democracies. The question of the underdeveloped countries was also discussed, and the attitude toward Socialist Parties in the West, and the attitude toward Stalinism. However, the most important subject, and the basis for the showdown with Molotov, was the Yugoslav problem.

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What follows is based on the shorthand minutes of the secret part of the Plenum about the showdown itself.

In February, at the Supreme Soviet meeting, Molotov's attitude had already been different from the line taken toward the Yugoslav problem by Khrushchev and most of the other Politburo members, and this became clear to me, and to the majority of the Political *aktiv* when we heard of the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Belgrade. In February, however, Khrushchev did not attack Molotov because he needed him in the showdown with Malenkov. This is proved by the fact that the Soviet Politburo permitted his official address to the Supreme Soviet to express views which opposed those of the majority of the Politburo. Yet there is no doubt that the texts of such speeches are scrupulously approved by the Politburo, and primarily by the First Party Secretary before they are made.

From the stenographic record of the secret part of the Plenum, it seemed that preparations for Molotov's removal began immediately after Malenkov's resignation. In the spring of last year, the Politburo held a meeting at which Molotov was criticized as Minister of Foreign Affairs for his attitude toward the Yugoslav problem and several other international problems. Molotov was accused of having hampered the reestablishing of Soviet-Yugoslav relations by all means.

Khrushchev and Molotov Battle Over Tito

Before the Khrushchev and Bulganin departure for Belgrade, the Politburo held another meeting at which Molotov opposed the visit. Molotov was for reestablishing international relations with Yugoslavia but, for ideological reasons, resisted reestablishment of Party relations with the Yugoslav Communist Party. What he had in mind was not only Khrushchev and Bulganin's visit to Belgrade but also the character of their visit.

These facts were given by Khrushchev in his opening speech to the secret part of the July Plenum. As a result of Politburo discussions, Khrushchev continued, Molotov still had not changed his attitude. The disagreement found its expression in the adoption of two Politburo resolutions. In one, the majority of the Politburo recognizes the necessity of the Belgrade visit and the necessity of attempting to reconstitute inter-Party relations with Yugoslavia. In the second resolution, Molotov's attitude was described, appraised by Khrushchev and the rest of the Politburo, and a decision was taken to put it up for discussion at the earliest Plenum of the CC of the CPSU.

At the July Plenum, Khrushchev once again charged Molotov with having prevented the reestablishment of international relations with Yugoslavia, and denounced his attitude on this issue as both erroneous and against the Party line.

Molotov Battles And . . .

The stenographic record showed that Molotov addressed the meeting after Khrushchev's speech and explained his viewpoint. However, in the discussion which followed and lasted for several days, the Plenum of the CC declared itself against Molotov's position. In addition to Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Susslov, and Shepilov criticized Molotov severely. The discussion was accompanied by a series of personal skirmishes, abusive remarks flowed freely, and time and again speeches were interrupted. This was particularly true of Molotov's speech.

I shall give an example. When Molotov was explaining his viewpoint that Party problems should not be discussed with Tito because Tito was anti-Soviet and his views far removed from Communism and rather close to those of anti-Communists, Khrushchev interrupted him, shouting: "*But in 1939 you could talk to Ribbentrop!*" Incidentally, it occurred to me while I was reading the minutes that the comparison to Ribbentrop was not very flattering for Tito.

** * * and Capitulates*

As a result of the violent discussion, Molotov made a short declaration toward the end of the secret meeting, occupying not more than one page of the shorthand minutes, in which in an extremely formal manner, he listed Khrushchev's charges and admitted that they were well founded. He also said that he yielded to the Central Committee's view of the Yugoslav problem. His declaration was so formal that I had no doubt when I read it that it was only Molotov's attempt to save what still could be saved. It was an attempt to take away from Khrushchev all the arguments which could be used for Molotov's dismissal.

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An Allegedly "Impersonal" Encounter

The shorthand minutes showed that the discussion was full of Khrushchev's personal remarks about Molotov. Khrushchev therefore devoted a great deal of space in his closing speech to assurances that there was no question of a personal misunderstanding between him and Molotov. Personally, he said he had nothing against Molotov: his sole concern was Party matters. These assurances were so numerous that I understood them to mean their opposite. Besides, even in his closing comments, Khrushchev could not resist making a personal remark leveled at Molotov. He said, and I remember that passage extremely well, "Vyacheslav Mikhailovitch, all this is your wife's fault. It would be much better for you if you didn't listen to her. She pushes you and makes you ambitious. She is your evil spirit."

Such was the general outline of the showdown with Molotov at the secret session of the Plenum last July.

THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO POLAND IS NOT A DIPLOMAT BUT A PROCONSUL

The stenographic of the secret part of the Plenum of the CC of the CPSU also contained many matters which pertained to Poland and Polish-Soviet relations. The question of the real role of the Soviet Ambassadors to Poland, particularly Popov and Lebediev, confirmed a state of affairs I had suspected for a long time. The Soviet ambassador in Poland was more a proconsul interfering in the internal affairs of the country than the diplomatic representative of a friendly nation. He does not take into account either the feelings of the people, or the Party leaders' ambitions. There is, of course, nothing new in this. What is new is that it was described in this manner at a Central Committee meeting in Moscow with Khrushchev and Kaganovitch there.

How was it that the question of the behavior of the Soviet Ambassadors to Poland was discussed at the secret meeting of the July Plenum? It so happened that Molotov's activity as Minister of Foreign Affairs had already been examined, and in order to substantiate their criticism of him, Khrushchev, Kaganovitch, and others cited facts which either directly or indirectly discredited him. Among other things, the activities of the Soviet ambassadors to Poland emerged.

Long before I read the shorthand minutes of the July Plenum, I heard rumors and sometimes even full details which threw light on the real role of the Soviet ambassadors to Poland. Besides, I was in personal contact with other Soviet inspectors in Poland. Thus, I often met Professor Alexandrov, ideological tutor of some of the Polish training schools, Comrade Nietchkina, guardian of the Polish philosophers, Professor Kuzminov, who occasionally came from Moscow to inspect the Polish economists and their work, Comrade Pankratova, member of the Central Committee in Moscow and patron of Polish historians, and many others. On the basis of these contacts and seeing their condescending attitude toward Poles, I could easily imagine how the Soviet ambassador, whose rank was much higher, behaved. But it is quite a different thing to imagine things and to find a confirmation of one's suspicions in Khrushchev's or Kaganovitch's speeches, and the stenographic minutes of the July Plenum secret session confirmed them amply.

Kaganovitch Admits that Popov Liked to Give Orders

At the Plenum Kaganovitch criticized Molotov's activities as Foreign Minister and, among other things, appraised the Soviet ambassador's work in Poland. Kaganovitch maintained that Popov's behavior was simply inexcusable. What was this inexcusable behavior? According to the report, *Popov thought he was fully entitled to issue orders to the Comrades in the leadership of the Polish Party.* He grossly interfered in Polish internal affairs. Kaganovitch said that Popov was intriguing among the Polish Party leaders and inciting them one against the other. Moreover, Popov spoke disparagingly, in the presence of Polish comrades, of the Polish Party leadership. Such behavior on the part of a Soviet Ambassador to Poland, Kaganovitch said, was inadmissible.

While I read the above criticisms of the Soviet Ambassador's behavior by Kaganovitch, I involuntarily asked myself the following questions: First, Popov became ambassador to Poland in June 1953 and remained at his post until March 1954. He was, therefore, Ambassador after Stalin's death, after Beria's purge, and when Khrushchev was made First Party Secretary, and came to Warsaw on

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several occasions. It is hard to believe that the Soviet leadership was unaware of Popov's behavior, yet in spite of this his activities in Warsaw were tolerated.

Second, I wondered how meek the PZPR Politburo was if it had tolerated Popov's actions for so long. This same Popov was not even a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. They even tolerated him when they were no longer obliged to listen to Stalin's orders.

But the criticism of the Soviet ambassadors to Poland made at the July Plenum was not limited to Popov only. In his closing speech at the secret session of the Plenum, Khrushchev violently attacked another Soviet ambassador to Poland, Lebediev.

Khrushchev Admits That Lebediev and Popov Are Like Twins

Commenting on Lebediev's activities, Khrushchev used the same expressions as Kaganovitch did about Popov. Among other things, Khrushchev maintained that Lebediev took it upon himself to be a leader of political life in Poland, and used to summon the highest Polish Party dignitaries to the Soviet Embassy and tell them what to do. In addition, Khrushchev accused Lebediev of having written a book on Poland which had already been sent to be printed, but its publication was stopped at the last moment. Had it been published it would have done irreparable damage to Polish-Soviet relations. Lebediev had stated in his book, among other things, that the bulk of the Polish intelligentsia was fascist.

Nor was that all, for Khrushchev also said that Lebediev formulated a fundamentally erroneous thesis that the Polish Workers Party had been set up as a result of the Soviet offensive on the eastern front, and as a result of the great Russian victories. And yet, Khrushchev said, the roots of this Party were in the Polish people's independent struggle.

In the light of the stenographic record of the CC's secret session in Moscow, it is easy to understand why Khrushchev considered the appearance of Lebediev's book a disaster. The theses contained in it would have discredited the Soviets in the Polish readers' eyes.

After criticizing the book, Khrushchev returned to Lebediev's activities in Poland, emphasizing that Lebediev's constant interference in Polish domestic matters was revolting and inexcusable. Khrushchev several times pointed out that such behavior was inconsistent with the instructions of the Soviet Party leadership. Khrushchev supported this statement with a quotation from the Russian Party's CC resolution which forbade ambassadors to interfere in the domestic matters of the People's Democracies. What struck me was the fact that *Lebediev had been Soviet Ambassador to Poland for seven years and therefore had not been complying with CC decisions for some time.* In addition, Khrushchev also hinted that this type of harmful activity was connected with the past and with Beria's times.

For Breaking Party Resolutions: the Order of Lenin

This violent Khrushchev criticism of Lebediev was made at the Plenum in July of last year. The minutes of the speech reached Poland in October, but almost simultaneously a Moscow Pravda communique reached Warsaw about Lebediev having been awarded the Order of Lenin. It so happened that I read that issue of Pravda and the minutes of the Khrushchev speech during the same week. Which was I to believe? The Khrushchev who had criticized Lebediev's conduct as Soviet Ambassador to Poland so violently, or the Khrushchev who had awarded him the highest Soviet decoration for meritorious achievements and services rendered to the Soviet fatherland? Who was I to believe the Khrushchev who accused Lebediev of violating the Central Committee resolutions or the Khrushchev who considered Lebediev to be a suitable man for the post of Soviet Ambassador to Finland?

MIKOYAN ON THE "BROTHERLY SOVIET AID"

One of the most interesting problems discussed at the secret session of the July Plenum in Moscow was the problem of economic relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. Mikoyan devoted a good deal of space to that problem in his speech. I read those passages with a good deal of interest because I had written a series of articles on those relations for Party and economic publications. One of my articles, published in Trybuna Ludu, was reprinted in the Cominform paper, For A Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy. Why do I speak of that now? Because I had closely followed the Party

line in my articles, yet when I read Mikoyan's speech I saw that everything I had written in those articles *was simply a lie*. Of course I knew many facts which proved that the Soviet Union was taking advantage of many privileges in its economic relations with Poland, but only after reading Mikoyan's speech did I realize that economic discrimination was applied to all of the captive countries.

Mikoyan denounced these discriminatory measures and plainly implied that it was not exceptional but the general rule. What was this general economic discrimination with regard to the captive countries? I shall mention some of the examples I found in the stenographic record of the secret session of the July Plenum.

Joint Stock Companies for Exploitation, Not For Help

The problem Mikoyan discussed particularly extensively was that of the so-called mixed companies' activities. Mixed companies were commercial or industrial enterprises set up by the Soviets in almost all the captive countries. In such a company there are two partners: the Soviet Union and the People's Democracy in which the company operates. According to the statutes of these companies, there is complete equality between the two partners.

In all the variety of forms of so-called Soviet brotherly help extended to the People's Democracies, the mixed companies always set up as an example of the Soviet Union's sacrifices for its younger brothers. The Romanian Premier Gheorghiu-Dej once said that mixed companies were the most efficacious and profitable form of Soviet brotherly aid offered to the countries building socialism. The mixed companies were given in ideological training as an example of proletarian internationalism. This was the official Party and ideological line. However, at the secret session of the July Plenum, Mikoyan said that the mixed companies were the most conspicuous form of Russian interference in the domestic economic affairs of the People's Democracies. They were, in Mikoyan's opinion, a sign of Soviet nationalism, a form of exploitation of weaker countries by the U. S. S. R., and they had become an example of economic exploitation of the People's Democracies which is why they had to be dissolved.

Chinese Communists Slap Moscow's Face

But the mixed companies were dissolved not only because they were inconsistent with the principle of proletarian internationalism. And Mikoyan himself admitted it. Here is a passage of the shorthand minutes which I remember particularly well: "Did we need those mixed companies?" Mikoyan asked. "Were we very happy when our Comrade Mao Tse-tung put our nose out of joint by refusing to allow similar companies to be established in China? Shouldn't we draw a lesson from past mistakes and dissolve those companies?"

Mikoyan then explained in detail how the Soviet nose had been put out of joint by Mao Tse-tung. This even took place *after Stalin's death* when the Soviet Union proposed founding such mixed companies to China, for the production of tropical fruits in China which would then export a certain quantity of them to Russia. Mao Tse-tung did not agree to the offer and proposed instead that China export tropical fruits on a normal commercial basis. Thus, Mao gave a very eloquent appraisal of the mixed companies' activities from the point of view of Chinese interests.

The Negro Did the Job and Was Sent Away With Praise

In my opinion, these experiences explain why it was decided to wind up the mixed companies. However, while Mao was putting the Soviet nose out of joint about mixed companies in China, mixed companies in the European People's Democracies continued to be a symbol of Soviet brotherly aid. In December 1954 I was in Moscow and heard a certain Meisshikov read his paper on Mixed Companies, Symbol of Soviet Brotherly Aid Offered to the People's Democracies, to a Conference of Social Sciences at the Soviet Central Party Committee. As we know, most of the mixed companies have been dissolved, but some of them still exist. Secondly, what struck me particularly when I read the minutes of the secret session was that the dissolution of the companies was not in the least explained by the arguments given by Mikoyan to the secret session of the July Plenum.

On the contrary, in the communiqué announcing their dissolution, I read that they had played a very important role in the development of the People's Democracies, that they had been a symbol of the brotherly Soviet aid offered to these countries, that they had been dissolved merely because their task had been completed. The Soviet dictators of the mixed companies received the highest decorations from the countries in which they had operated. That is why I was

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amazed at the fantastic hypocrisy of the Soviet Party leaders, and their unwillingness to tell the truth, when I saw the minutes of Mikoyan's speech. In practice, I saw one of the aspects of the alleged open sincerity of the political life in the new post-Stalin era.

Soviet Experts Are Arrogant and Overpaid

In another passage of the record of the secret session, Mikoyan also gave a fair assessment of the behavior of the Soviet experts and delegates in the People's Democracies. The work of our experts abroad, Mikoyan said, necessitates a good deal of tact and modesty. In no case can we hurt the feelings of the local population. But in practice, Mikoyan said, our experts have constantly violated this rule. They have been patronizing and arrogant. They thought that everybody could learn from them, and that they had nothing to learn. In this way they often did a disservice to the cause of friendship between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. Mikoyan also admitted that the excessively high salaries of Soviet specialists were a source of discontent among local workers and employees.

Mikoyan devoted a great deal of space to Soviet-Yugoslav economic relations. He admitted that the breaking of the trade agreement with Yugoslavia in 1949 was a violation of international law, and there were many other instances, on a larger and smaller scale, of breaking trade agreements. Indeed, they were imperialistic moves, Mikoyan said.

Principles Are Principles: But Business Is Business

When I read this exceptionally frank statement of Mikoyan's I remembered several cases of unilateral breaking of trade agreements with Poland by the Soviet Union. I know, for example, that in the past few years, the Soviets broke the agreement on supplying wheat and cotton for Poland, and besides, the Soviet Union never paid any indemnity. Poland, on the other hand, was forced hastily to look for new sources of grain and cotton supplies on the Western markets.

From the minutes of the secret session, it emerged clearly that Mikoyan had violently condemned all discriminatory practices concerning the People's Democracies. Last January I could ascertain how sincere this condemnation of past mistakes was. I was told that Mikoyan had delivered an address at the Conference of Mutual Economic Aid which had been held last December in Budapest. There, the Polish delegation proposed, quite justifiably after all, that the export of Polish coal and farm products to the Soviet Union and the other People's Democracies, should be decreased. The Polish delegation also called attention to the necessity of increasing exports of machines because this was the only way to improve Poland's difficult economic situation.

In a long speech, Mikoyan said, among other things, that Poland's traditional exports were coal and farm produce and that she should continue to export them. I wonder how Mikoyan would have described this sort of economic aid last July?

WHAT IS POLAND TO THE SOVIET POLITBURO?

As I have mentioned several times, the secret session of the July Plenum was primarily a scene for the battle between Molotov and the rest of the Politburo. As usual in such battles, there was plenty of violent discussion and mutual recrimination, and we know that in the heat of argument, matters about which one normally remains silent reveal themselves. That is precisely what happened in the course of those discussions.

It began with Khrushchev attacking Molotov because the latter did not fully appreciate the damages that had arisen from the break with Marshal Tito and from the subsequent history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. This accusation seemed to have hurt Molotov a great deal. He violently defended his policies and in his reply to Khrushchev's attacks, Polish affairs were brought suddenly to the surface. In his comments on Poland, Molotov revealed the truth about Soviet leaders' attitudes toward the People's Democracies.

I quote here briefly some of the arguments Molotov used as I remember them from reading the stenographic report of that secret session.

Molotov began with an appraisal of the situation which preceded the break with Yugoslavia. Indeed, he said, we made a grave error here. Why? Because without having exhausted all the possibilities for conciliation, we brought about a break with Yugoslavia so sharply. I admit, he went on, that this error in our policy caused many disadvantageous complications. Can the blame for this, however, be put on Beria and Beriaism?

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I must admit that I read this last sentence with great emotion. Was it Molotov's intention, I thought, to blame the break with Tito on Beria, and also on Stalin and his other collaborators? But Molotov had something quite different in mind. No, he said, to blame Beria and only Beria for breaking with Yugoslavia would have been a great error and untrue for an equal share of guilt belongs to Yugoslavia and Marshal Tito. At that time, Tito's behavior was provocative and anti-Soviet. If we had not then adopted the strong and definite stand we took, he continued, we would have been confronted with grave complications in the other People's Democracies.

And that is how Polish affairs came to the surface. I read and did not believe my own eyes.

Poland is So Many and So Many Divisions . . .

Let us take Poland as an example, Molotov continued. Which is more important to use, Poland or Yugoslavia? Poland has 10 million people more than Yugoslavia and Poland can mobilize 10 divisions more than Yugoslavia. And we know only too well that not everything was right with the Polish Army at the time of our conflict with Tito. There was, as we remember, Gomulka in Poland. If we had not taken a strong stand in Yugoslavia's case, Molotov explained, who knows what would have happened in Poland? Poland would have wavered and gone Yugoslavia's way. That is why, Molotov stated, our sharp and definite reaction in the Yugoslav affair was perfectly justified, for it prevented a still greater disaster.

However, we must admit, Molotov said, that our tactics were not always proper. The best proof of that is the fact that we failed to repair our position in Yugoslavia; hence, the conclusion that the policy we followed was false.

I must say that I read this part of Molotov's speech with great irritation. Molotov was altogether cynical. Is that, I thought, the way a Soviet Foreign Minister and Moscow Politburo member treats the friendly People's Democracies? Is Poland for him merely the equivalent of so many people and so much cannon fodder? For only in this sense was Poland more valuable to him than Yugoslavia. What should we think of our own Party line with respect to Soviet policy, I thought, a policy which allegedly treats large and small nations equally? Wasn't this cynical statement of Molotov's, the acting chief of Soviet foreign policy, a proof that the Soviet Union was quite ready to sell out a smaller ally for the price of gaining a stronger one, one who has at its disposal a larger number of divisions?

While reading Molotov's statement I was further struck by the fact that—as he put it—Soviet policy with respect to Yugoslavia was wrong because it failed to bring the anticipated results. Is it true, I thought, that even in dealings with the People's Democracies, Molotov considers all methods, including provocations, permissible provided they bring the expected results?

All Wolves Howl the Same

I was particularly indignant about the fact that Molotov was justifying this policy of threat and blackmail even after Stalin's death. Even in the post-Stalinist period, Moscow's policy of table pounding with respect to Poland and the other People's Democracies was still justified.

I have already written that Molotov's speech made me indignant. I had naively supposed that in the other Politburo members' speeches, particularly in that of First Party Secretary Khrushchev, I would find unequivocal condemnation of Molotov's stand. When I finished the stenographic record, I saw that my illusions were naive.

Certainly Khrushchev and other Politburo members attacked Molotov sharply, but their views were merely the other side of the same coin. Their attitudes toward the People's Democracies were similar to Molotov's; they differed from him only in their estimate of the situation. As an example, let us take Khrushchev's final speech. He argued against Molotov's thesis that in the Yugoslav case the policy was basically justified even if errors in it had taken place, for it prevented Titoist outbreaks in the other People's Democracies. Thus, Khrushchev said exactly the same thing as Molotov, except perhaps that he saw a different danger in the Yugoslav example.

What was the difference between them? Molotov saw the danger in the absence of harsh policies toward Tito: he maintained that without such policies, other countries would follow in Yugoslavia's footsteps. On the other hand, Khrushchev maintained that the danger lay in making policy too harsh and this would result in pushing other People's Democracies on the Yugoslav road,

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and this might have happened particularly after Stalin's death. Not with so much as a single word did he object to Molotov's contemptuous treatment of the People's Democracies.

I understood then that Molotov, Khrushchev, and Mikoyan were in perfect agreement as to the basic role of the People's Democracies. The difference lay only in the degree of advantage that a policy would bring to the Soviet Union. Was it to be a line of compromise and ignoring of ideological deviations, as Khrushchev and Mikoyan wanted, or was it to be the older policy advocated by Molotov? But all of them—Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Molotov treated the People's Democracies with equal contempt. The only difference was that the estimate by the first two was more realistic.

* * * * *

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Bialer, did you have a mission at any time to go to Moscow?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

In November and December, 1954, I was the Assistant Chief of the official delegation of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party to the party authorities in Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, while you were in Moscow, were you able to meet any of the top leaders of the Soviet Union?

The INTERPRETER. My most important task was rather to get in touch with the propaganda agencies in Moscow and Leningrad connected with the Russian Communist Party.

Naturally, in this capacity I met different, what you would call important people, both in the Soviet Union as well as in Poland.

But as far as the relations and the state of affairs in the Russian Communist Party are concerned, among the leadership of the Russian Communist Party, I know this from the official secret instructions which were sent from Moscow to Warsaw, and thus I got acquainted with most of them.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall a visit that Mr. Khrushchev made to Warsaw in April of 1955?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir; I recall this very well, indeed.

Mr. MORRIS. Did Khrushchev address the Communist Party workers in Warsaw in 1955?

The INTERPRETER. Khrushchev, after his arrival in Poland, first had a meeting with a large body of the workers in Novahuta. His second meeting in Poland was in Warsaw with the Central Committee and the active of the Polish Communist Party in Warsaw. I was present at both meetings.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, will you describe the makeup of the audience that attended this second meeting at which Khrushchev spoke?

The INTERPRETER. We called it the active of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Poland. This means the most active, important members of the Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the number?

The INTERPRETER. No more than 200 people, rather much less.

Mr. MORRIS. Much less than 200 people.

Now, will you tell us what Khrushchev said to that particular group of Polish Communists?

This is now April 1955, is it not?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

First, both of his speeches were very aggressive.

I drew a conclusion that the aim of his speech was to maintain an offensive spirit among the party workers.

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First, he started his speech by saying that the heavy industry and the armaments must be maintained at all cost.

Mr. MORRIS. Heavy industry and armaments must be maintained at all cost?

The INTERPRETER. At all cost.

For instance, I remember such a detail. He said:

It is true that you do not have good ladies' hats. It is true that there is probably not enough food in Poland. But you must remember, we must have, first of all, heavy industry. The more steel we produce for the Soviet bloc, the more sleepless nights Mr. Dulles will have in Washington.

Mr. MORRIS. "Mr. Dulles will have in Washington"?

The INTERPRETER. In Washington. Literally, he said, "He turns in his bed when he learns about it."

Again, the most provocative incident in his speech against the Western World was the following, and again I quote almost his words since I remember them so well:

"We are discussing coexistence, but, of course, we must realize that we cannot coexist eternally, for a long time. One of us must go to his grave."

Mr. MORRIS. Meaning the free world and the United States on the one hand, and the Polish nation on the other?

The INTERPRETER. On the one hand the United States, the Western World; on the other hand, the Soviet bloc. One of us must go one day to his grave.

[Continuing:] "We do not want to go to the grave.

"They," meaning Americans and the westerners, "they do not want to go to their grave, either.

"So what can be done?

"We must push them to their grave."

This was the general tone of his speech.

Certainly we could recognize immediately the difference between his tone when he was speaking for the newspapers or conferences and when he was speaking to us at that meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. There was a difference in his tone?

The INTERPRETER. There was a difference, a basic difference, in his tone. And, of course, the text, too.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, when you described that conversation to us, did Khrushchev use precisely the same emphasis that you have given us, or is that your estimate of Khrushchev's speech?

The INTERPRETER. Of course, there is a possibility that I misquoted 1 or 2 words. Basically I quoted him, since they were so important and I remembered them, and they were fixed in my memory.

In addition, of course, his speech was put on a tape and then I had the opportunity to listen to the tape again; so I remember this very well.

I heard it after the Geneva Conference.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, as an active propagandist, did you deal with the concept of coexistence?

The INTERPRETER. This was one of the most important matters to which I attended.

For instance, after the first Geneva Conference, I was sent to many provincial towns where I met the active of the local Communist Party, discussing the situation.

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I authored several instructions, several papers, for the party workers in this matter.

And, of course, there were organized for me several discussions in which I would pass, orally, my advices and instructions.

Mr. MORRIS. What is the concept of coexistence? Is it used as a weapon in Communist warfare?

The INTERPRETER. I would summarize this in such a way: Our most important task with regard to the coexistence business was to convince and to show to the people that the concept of coexistence is not a withdrawal on the part of the Soviet bloc, but an offensive.

Mr. MORRIS. You say it is not a withdrawal?

The INTERPRETER. Withdrawal—

Mr. MORRIS. But an offensive?

The INTERPRETER. But an offensive of the Soviet bloc.

This was necessary, because in the first period of the so-called coexistence, even the high membership of the Communist Party sometimes misunderstood the meaning of the Soviet policy.

This is why we were forced to organize a very large campaign all over Poland in order to straighten them out and to explain to them the real meaning of the coexistence campaign.

Senator BUTLER. In other words, this is just another twist in the devious road of the Communist Party to world domination?

The INTERPRETER. Basically, yes, sir, with this difference, that this is so important in the Communist strategy that I would call it, rather, basic strategy.

I would place it in a category of basic strategy, since one of the main purposes is to isolate the United States from the political, economic, and ideological point of view, in the world, and this, of course, is very important.

Senator BUTLER. In your opinion, is it equally important as the dissolution of the Comintern?

The INTERPRETER. I would say that the dissolution of the Comintern—

Mr. BIALER. Cominform.

The INTERPRETER. Cominform—is one of the expressions of this isolation campaign against the United States.

Senator BUTLER. In other words, it is part of the general policy?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir; part of a very large political program.

Mr. MORRIS. And would you say, Mr. Bialer, it was your purpose as an active propagandist to instruct the workers as to the meaning of this new strategy, particularly with respect to that aspect of it which indicated that it was not a withdrawal, but rather an offensive measure?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. This was one of my most important tasks.

We considered it as the most important job at that time. There was, for instance, a saying, a joke, circulated among the party members: "It is true that we do not want any more revolution because the Westerners will settle it themselves."

Mr. MORRIS. Now, how did the Geneva Conference of 1955 fit into this framework?

The INTERPRETER. As far as I conceived, on the basis of my observations as a propagandist in Poland, that Conference indeed was a point of issue for our propaganda, for all this coexistence campaign which I described for.

Not only in Poland, but also in the Russian Communist Party, in the Soviet Union, everywhere, this Conference was presented as a great Soviet victory. And may I tell you that my conviction is that the masses believed it.

Mr. MORRIS. The Polish masses and the people in the Communist countries believed it?

The INTERPRETER. This is my opinion.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you know anything about Khrushchev's manipulations of Beria, Malenkov, and Molotov?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; I can speak about these matters on the basis of three secret documents which I knew and which deal with this matter.

The first document was a letter, a secret letter of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, dealing with the matter of the Beria incident.

The second document was a letter of the leadership of the Russian Communist Party dealing with the dismissal of Malenkov.

And the third document is a secret official stenogram, minutes, of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, which took place in July 1955.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you went into these three episodes in this declaration that you prepared, did you not?

The INTERPRETER. Partly.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, will you succinctly, as briefly as possible, tell us about those three documents with respect to the question?

The INTERPRETER. First, these 3 documents describe the 3 basic stages in the personnel changes in the Soviet leadership.

The first will be liquidation of Beria, the second, dismissal of Malenkov, and the third, the alienation from the leadership of Molotov.

In the first letter, the reasons for the liquidation of Beria were given. In addition to those accusations which were made public in the press, there were also other accusations unknown to the party.

For instance—and this comes to my mind in view of the present visit of Marshal Tito in Moscow—one of the important accusations against Beria, secret accusations, was the following:

The accusation was such: The best proof that Beria was engaged in espionage activities directed against the Soviet Union was his suggestion, after the death of Stalin, to reestablish relations with Tito.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean that accusations were made against Beria because he sought to reestablish contact with Tito?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

For instance, I remember there was a very particular accusation that Beria wanted to establish a special telephone line between Moscow and Belgrade in order to be in touch with Tito.

In addition to those accusations which I enumerated in the document you mentioned, there was given also the method by which Beria was liquidated.

For instance, there was a paragraph I remember that a political bureau of the party could not reveal for some time its suspicions concerning Beria. So they had to approve even erroneous decisions of Beria for a certain period of time.

And one of the examples was the German affair.

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For instance, the Soviet policy toward Eastern Germany in 1953 which resulted in the Berlin revolt of June 1953, was initiated by Beria. The political bureau of the Russian Communist Party realized it. They didn't want to stop Beria's policy, so that he would not realize that they suspected him.

There is also, I remember now, another paragraph in that document which will probably interest you in view of the present de-Stalinization campaign.

And this paragraph consisted: There was a question:

How was it possible that we, the leadership of the Russian Communist Party, were able to liquidate Beria in such a short time after Stalin died, in only 3 months?

The whole idea of this argument was to prove that as long as Stalin lived, the leadership of the party did not know the true activities of Beria.

The final phase of this argument was that Beria became careless, and because he became so careless and also impudent, convinced of his power, we could discover his activities against the people.

I want to remind you that at that time Beria was liquidated with the help of Malenkov, who was against him.

In February 1955, Malenkov's turn came.

The most characteristic aspect of the second document dealing with Malenkov's affair is that very many accusations directed against Beria had been repeated now with regard to Malenkov.

Of course, this is one of the aspects of the Soviet tactics. Those accusations were not revealed at the time of the liquidation of Beria, but the leadership waited for Malenkov's help to liquidate Beria, and then they liquidated Malenkov with the same accusations.

For instance, an accusation concerning the agricultural crises was repeated with regard to Beria and then also with regard to Malenkov.

The main accusation against Malenkov was that he underestimated the importance of building the heavy industry.

It was maintained that such a policy of underestimating heavy industry was to become dangerous for the people's democracies.

This was in connection with Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister of Hungary, who was following the same Malenkov line in Hungary.

Malenkov was also indicted for coresponsibility in the Leningrad trials.

The Leningrad trials lasted several years, and in those trials several thousands of very active Communists were liquidated.

It was on that occasion of the dismissal of Malenkov that Shepilov, the present Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, appeared.

At that time, it was Shepilov who was directing the whole anti-Malenkov campaign.

I think that one could say that probably the present appointment of Shepilov is a kind of reward for his services in the dismissal of Malenkov.

During the same session which decided the dismissal of Malenkov, the Molotov affair started.

Again, the same method was applied as with regard to Malenkov. Molotov was accused of a nonconformist speech which he delivered at the time of Malenkov's dismissal. He was not accused at the time of the Malenkov dismissal because he was helpful at the time. He was accused of this several months later.

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Around 6 weeks after the dismissal of Malenkov, Molotov's incident took place.

At that time, the secret meeting of the Presidium of the Russian Communist Party took place, and the discussion concerned the relations with Yugoslavia.

At that meeting Molotov announced himself against the reestablishment of relations with Yugoslavia, relations government-to-government.

He was criticized at that meeting and then at the time when Khrushchev and Bulganin left for Belgrade to visit Tito, he agreed, of course, with their policy, meaning to reestablish the official relations between the two governments.

However, although Molotov agreed to a reestablishment of the official international relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, he did not approve of Khrushchev's and Bulganin's visit, and he did not approve of a reestablishment of party relationship between the Russian Communist Party and Tito's Communist Party.

However, he was outvoted. The decision was taken that Khrushchev and Bulganin should go to Yugoslavia, and the decision was taken that Molotov's disapproval should be discussed in July of the same year at the next meeting of the Presidium of the Communist Party.

And indeed, in July 1955, the meeting took place and the central committee of the Communist Party officially condemned Molotov's position.

In addition to this matter, several other important matters were discussed at that meeting.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you cover those in this declaration?

The INTERPRETER. The minutes of the July meeting of the central committee took more than 100 pages, and, of course, I couldn't cover them in this document.

Mr. MORRIS. Does it cover the general area?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, are there any more points that you want to make with respect to my general question at this time?

Mr. Bialer, I realize it is a vast subject. There are some aspects of intelligence which directly relate to the work of the Internal Security Subcommittee. If you think that you have made a fairly representative statement in response to the question, we might go to these other subjects.

The INTERPRETER. I hope that perhaps at another occasion I will have an opportunity to speak about this document, which is very interesting. So probably at the present moment I shall not continue.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you want to make some statements about it now, by way of concluding that last aspect of your testimony?

The INTERPRETER. I would like to add that there was also a very long and important discussion concerning Austria at that meeting.

Molotov proposed the Soviet withdrawal from Austria.

Now, the argument against his position, the argument taken by Khrushchev, was that the Soviet withdrawal from Austria will not cost the Soviet Union anything; it will be without any importance, anyway.

This kind of withdrawal would not weaken the Soviet Union from any point of view, from any practical point of view.

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It would not weaken the Soviet Union.

That is all for the moment as far as this matter is concerned.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, in your work in the Communist Party of Poland, did you come to know anything about espionage or military intelligence that was carried out by the Polish Communist leaders?

The INTERPRETER. You mean, against the United States?

Mr. MORRIS. Against the United States.

The INTERPRETER. Yes, I know certain facts. Are you interested?

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know any Polish military intelligence agents who came to the United States?

The INTERPRETER. I know two such cases.

The first case concerned Colonel Melchior.

Mr. MORRIS. Who was Colonel Melchior?

The INTERPRETER. He is one of the most outstanding and respected employees of the Polish military intelligence.

I have known him personally for the last 10 years.

In 1949, we were working together and then at that time in 1949 he passed to the strictly military intelligence activities.

He was appointed as the Polish vice consul in New York City.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, was that a cover for his activities, or was that his real role?

The INTERPRETER. Well, sir, I will answer this way: Colonel Melchior is on such a level and he is considered as such an outstanding member of the military intelligence in Poland, and so well known in Poland, that if he were appointed as the Ambassador to the United States, it would not be too much of a distinction.

So since he was only vice consul, which is not such a high position, it was evident that this was only a cover for his other activities.

Senator BUTLER. That was not the question. The question was whether he was using his position as a cover for his real activities.

The INTERPRETER. Yes, I am sure of it, that this was only a cover for his activities concerning military intelligence.

Senator BUTLER. And espionage?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

I see as, for instance, one of the indications, that after his return to Poland, he went directly to military intelligence and is working in the same department he was working in at the moment he left Poland.

I saw him in December 1955, exactly in that capacity.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did he use the name of Melchior, or did he go by any other name?

The INTERPRETER. No, sir. His true name was Melon, but the name which he is using for years is Melchior, the first one.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what was the other example of espionage in the United States?

The INTERPRETER. The second case, well known to me, was sending to the United States an officer of the Polish military intelligence, Samuel Ehrlich.

I have known him also for very many years.

In 1950-51, there were rumors spread on purpose that he was leaving for Moscow for a special school in the field of intelligence.

So he disappeared from Poland.

In reality, as I learned later, he did not go to Moscow at that time. He was sent to the United States and he was assigned to look for a job, and he received a position at one of the American universities.

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He went to one of the American universities.

Mr. MORRIS. And do you know that he had an espionage assignment at the time?

The INTERPRETER. I am certain of it. He was and he is presently a captain in the Polish military intelligence. I saw him before I left Poland, in Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, you do know what that man looks like; do you not?

The INTERPRETER. Very, very exactly, I know.

Mr. MORRIS. And if we show you some pictures, you might be able to tell us who he is?

The INTERPRETER. Surely.

Mr. MORRIS. You do not know whether he used the name of Samuel Ehrlich when he was teaching at one of the American universities.

The INTERPRETER. He was not a professor at that university. He was at the university, and, of course, I would recognize him.

When I said that he was at the university, I did not mean that he was a professor. He was a student at the university, in order to have an official coverage for his activities in this country. He is not an old man.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, how is the Polish intelligence organized?

The INTERPRETER. I couldn't give you exact information on this subject. This is a very specialized subject.

Mr. MORRIS. And your field is propaganda and not intelligence?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir; mostly political propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you know any of the American Communists who left the United States and returned to Poland, their native Poland?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; several cases.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a man named Arski?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir; I know him.

Mr. MORRIS. Is that Stefan Arski?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Stefan Arski used to be one of the people on the Polish desk of the Office of War Information in the United States.

What was Stefan Arski doing?

The INTERPRETER. Mr. Stefan Arski is presently in Poland. He is a journalist, and one of the most violently antiwestern and anti-American journalists. He specializes in American affairs, and he contributes mostly to the People's Tribune, an official organ of the Communist Party in Poland.

He wrote several books which we used as a kind of basis for our anti-American propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mandel here has the testimony before the Kersten committee, the House committee that investigated the Katyn Forest massacre, and Mr. Arski of the Office of War Information figured in that inquiry.

I wonder if we might put that testimony before that committee about Mr. Arski into the record.

Senator BUTLER. It will be so ordered.

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(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 287" and reads as follows:)

EXHIBIT No. 287

Excerpt from the Katyn Forest massacre, hearings before the Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, 82d Congress, 2d session on investigation of the murder of thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia, part 7. November 11, 1952 (p. 1993)

Mr. MACHROWICZ (Representative Thaddeus M. Machrowicz of Michigan). Did you know a Stefan Arski, alias Arthur Salzman?

Mr. DAVIS (Elmer Davis, wartime director of the Office of War Information). No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. For your information, he was also employed by the Office of War Information in 1945. He is now in Warsaw, Poland, and is editor in chief of the Communist paper Robotnik, which means the Worker, the most outspoken anti-American organ in Warsaw. He at that time was also an employee of the Office of War Information. You have no recollection of him?

Mr. DAVIS. No.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. You have no recollection of either Ambassador Ciechanowski or Congressman Lesinski warning you about the fact that these three persons were known Communists, and were in the employ of the Office of War Information?

Mr. DAVIS. I don't remember that Mr. Lesinski ever warned me about anything. Mr. Ciechanowski, perhaps by his excessive number of warnings, made me forget which particular ones he especially spoke about.

Mr. MACHROWICZ. Would it refresh your recollection if I told you that you told Ambassador Ciechanowski to keep away from that matter?

Mr. DAVIS. I don't know, * * *

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you know Irving Potash?

Mr. Chairman, Irving Potash was convicted under the Smith Act and ordered deported to Poland in 1955.

What is Mr. Potash doing in Poland?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, I know him. I spent with Irving Potash, formerly a member of the political bureau of the Polish Communist Party, of the American Communist Party—I spent with him 2 weeks at the International Communist House, Holiday House, in Zakopane, in Poland. This was March 1955.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what is Potash's job in Poland?

The INTERPRETER. The most characteristic factor concerning this man is that he was not used in Poland for the propaganda work, and he disappeared in Poland altogether.

He disappeared. He is no more.

I remember those 2 weeks I spent with him. At that time he was very much emotionally broken, affected. He suffered very much seeing the reality in Poland.

He had no idea before how bad things are in Poland.

Particularly he was impressed by the unfriendly attitude of the Polish people, the Polish masses, toward the Polish Communist Party.

In any case, the fact that a man of this caliber was not used in Poland in a propaganda way, this is a very exceptional case, and rather indicates that unpleasant things happened to him.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Henrik Podolski?

Mr. Chairman, Henrik Podolski was the former editor-in-chief of Glos Ludowy, a Polish Communist paper in Detroit.

The INTERPRETER. Yes, I know Henrik Podolski.

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Henrik Podolski has two main assignments presently in Poland. The first one is to work in the campaign of repatriation of the Polish emigres, postwar emigres in the West, and the second, to instruct the American paper, People's Voice, in Detroit.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean, he is still running the Detroit newspaper?

The INTERPRETER. This paper receives strict instructions from Poland, and he is the man who is sending them.

I met him several times in connection with his work in the propaganda division and foreign affairs division of the central committee of the Polish Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I have many other such instances, at least some other instances such as that, together with a great deal of other material, and if you say, Senator, we do have to stop now, I think we will have to resume again on Monday.

Senator BUTLER. Yes. We will adjourn now and recess until Monday.

I would like to say this for the record, that the testimony of Mr. Bialer this morning, with its importance to the work of the Internal Security Subcommittee and the understanding of recent world events, indicates the great usefulness of defectors. This testimony shows very convincingly that there are important people behind the Iron Curtain who want to join the free world. When these people come over to us, they bring important intelligence information.

In this way, we can learn the real meaning of the Communist strategy of world conquest.

But more important, their defection impresses on the world the great vulnerability of the Communist world—the fact that these people are kept in bondage. All our agencies as well as the Congress should do everything possible to encourage more defections.

I want to thank you, Mr. Bialer, for coming here. We will stand in recess until Monday morning.

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, the Judiciary Committee meets Monday morning. Suppose we make it 2 o'clock in the afternoon on Monday?

Senator BUTLER. We will stand in recess until 2 o'clock Monday afternoon, at which time we will ask you to return, Mr. Bialer.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you return at 2 o'clock, Mr. Bialer?

The INTERPRETER. I want to thank you, sir, for the opportunity which you gave me to come to this committee and to give this testimony.

Mr. MORRIS. And we are grateful to you, Mr. Bialer.

Senator BUTLER. Thank you, sir.

(Whereupon, at 11:55 a. m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p. m., Monday, June 11, 1956.)

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MONDAY, JUNE 11, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY AND
OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a. m., in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator Eastland.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel; William Rusher, administrative counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, research director.

Chairman EASTLAND. The committee will come to order.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, both the witness, Mr. Bialer, and the interpreter have been sworn. It is a continued hearing.

Chairman EASTLAND. Proceed.

TESTIMONY OF SEWERYN BIALER, AS INTERPRETED BY JAN KARSKI—Resumed

Mr. MORRIS. Senator, in connection with the aspects of the testimony of Mr. Bialer on internal security, we had at the last session mentioned the case of Samuel Ehrlich, who was an important intelligence espionage personality in Poland, who was sent to the United States with the knowledge of the witness. He came here under the cover of a student at an American university.

We also had the case of Colonel Melchior, who was the Polish vice consul in New York, and Mr. Bialer has testified that, even though he was appearing as a vice consul in New York, he was actually one of the top military espionage people in Poland.

We had discussed the case of Irving Potash, who is now in Poland. We had the case of Stefan Arski, who was one of the officials of our own Office of War Information, who is one of the people in Poland directing anti-American propaganda against the United States.

We had the case of Mr. Podolski, who is now, according to the testimony of Mr. Bialer, directing a Detroit newspaper from Warsaw.

Now, we have some more cases like that, Senator. I would like to go into those at the beginning of this hearing.

Chairman EASTLAND. Proceed.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know a Mr. Kalescki?

The INTERPRETER. Michael Kalescki.

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Mr. MORRIS. Michael Kaleski. What is Michael Kaleski doing now?

The INTERPRETER. He arrived in Poland in the summer of 1955.

Mr. MORRIS. From the United States?

The INTERPRETER. From the United States. Yes. He was working in the United States, in the United Nations Organization, and he arrived in Poland in the summer of 1955.

Presently he occupies a position of personal economic ambassador to the virtual economic dictator of Poland, Minc.

Mr. MORRIS. What is he doing? You say he is an economic adviser?

The INTERPRETER. A personal economic adviser.

Mr. MORRIS. To the—

The INTERPRETER. To the virtual economic dictator in Poland, named Minc. In addition, he is also charged with studies concerning the economic situation in the United States and in other parts of the world.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what is George Siskind doing?

George Siskind, Senator, was an American Communist who was prosecuted under the Smith Act and has been deported to Poland.

The INTERPRETER. Presently, he is working in the Institute of International Affairs, which is attached to the Polish Foreign Ministry.

And again in this institute, he is charged with American affairs.

I would like to stress here that Siskind is particularly active presently in Poland in the field of anti-American propaganda.

The second question which I would like to stress here is this: As you know, recently there were discussions in Poland concerning relaxation of the propaganda and also a tendency to disclose more truth about the Western World to the Polish people. Siskind was one of those men who did not want it.

Recently, for instance, he published an article in this year, the current year, an article in a Communist paper, New Roads, in which he attacked America with fantastic lies.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, do we have anything in the record to show what position Mr. George Siskind had with the American Communist Party?

Mr. MANDEL. He was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and a teacher at its national training school.

Mr. MORRIS. In the United States?

Mr. MANDEL. In the United States.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you know Mr. Katz-Suchy?

The INTERPRETER. I have known him very well indeed. I worked with him for a while.

Mr. MORRIS. And you say you have known him very well?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what he has been doing in Poland?

The INTERPRETER. First, he is director of that Institute of International Affairs which I mentioned before, where Siskind is working; and, as you know, he is also a Polish delegate to the United Nations, to different conferences of the United Nations.

At the return of Katz-Suchy to Poland from the United States, where he was a guest of the United States, it was exploited by him and by the party for violent anti-American propaganda.

I must say that he was doing it in a very primitive, obvious way.

I would like to add here, lately I could observe some changes in him. For instance, in December 1955 I took part in a certain discussion in the party where Katz-Suchy was also present.

The discussion concerned peaceful coexistence, and there Katz-Suchy made an observation that he doubted personally if the United States really wanted a war.

For this he was criticized very much by other participants in the discussion.

Mr. MORRIS. What was that last answer? I am sorry, sir.

The INTERPRETER. For this he was criticized by other participants in the discussion.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

Is there anything more he wants to say about Mr. Katz-Suchy?

The INTERPRETER. At the present, I would prefer not to say more.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything about the Soviet truce team in Korea, the Polish truce team making up the neutral commission in Korea?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; I have certain information from the highest sources.

The first one, for instance: The Chairman of the Polish Truce Commission in Korea, General Morsky, was my subordinate in the party before he left for Korea.

For instance, the Polish commissions for Korea and for Vietnam received a special fund in order to get collaborators from other nations, for instance, Swiss people, or Canadians, or others.

In this respect, I would like to say, for instance, how well it was organized. In the summer of 1955, a special officer of the Polish military intelligence, Major Chylinski, left for Vietnam in order to check, or supervise, this kind of activity.

He left in order to check how the work of getting agents from among the Swiss, Canadian, or French commissions was going on.

Mr. MORRIS. Let me see if I understand that, now. You say that Mr. Bialer says that special funds were allocated by the Polish Communist Government so that these funds could be used to recruit and to get agents in other delegations who would help the Polish team?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Chairman EASTLAND. Now, wait a minute. He said he had that information from the highest sources. Who are those sources?

The INTERPRETER. As I told you, Senator, the first source of information was General Morsky, the chairman of the Polish team in Korea, who was my subordinate in the party. The second source of information was General Krzenien, his predecessor in Korea. The third source of information was General Grosz, the chairman of the Polish team in the neutral commission in Cambodia.

But the most reliable information certainly was that from Major Chylinski, who was sent to Vietnam to supervise this action of recruiting agents.

I had also other sources of information which I would prefer to give you at some other occasion.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, was this an intelligence—

The INTERPRETER. I have in mind closed-door.

Mr. MORRIS. I see. Was this an intelligence operation?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Have you other—

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The INTERPRETER. He was formerly adjutant of the chief of the Polish military intelligence, General Komar.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I wonder if you would give us some more examples as to how this operation was conducted.

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

There was one other means. There is a special instruction and funds for the Polish member of the Polish team to give loans, even to impose financial loans to the members of other commissions to have them in hand.

Mr. MORRIS. Let me see if I understand that. You mean there was a money grant made so that people on the Polish team could make money loans to people on the other neutral teams?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir. And one other instance: Usually Polish members have vodka, a certain amount of vodka which they distribute in order to get social relations with them and to have occasion to speak to them and to get them as agents, to have social relations as often as possible with them.

What is probably more important is this: Any derogatory information about anyone from any other commission is very meticulously collected and immediately sent to Warsaw and eventually used in the future.

Another factor, for instance: The Polish teams in South as well as North Korea are in closest touch with the central committee of the Communist Party in North Korea.

In this respect, numerous meetings of the central committee of the North Korean Communist Party were held. Members of the Polish teams would be there, and they would receive advice from the central committee of the North Korean Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean the North Korean Communists would be advising the members of the so-called Polish neutral team?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Are there any other such instances, Mr. Bialer? Do you know of any other such instances?

The INTERPRETER. I know this problem well. So I think probably it would be better, sir, if you would ask me specific questions. I don't know what you have in mind.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, a news dispatch in today's Washington Daily News, for instance, says that:

Allied forces in South Korea are gradually being disarmed by the creeping obsolescence of their weapons compared with the illegally modernized Communist forces in North Korea, high American officials charged today.

If the United States, the Republic of Korea, and other allies continue to abide by the 1953 truce restrictions much longer, their forces in Korea will be completely outdone by the Communists, these sources warn.

Now, do you know that the Communists in North Korea are building up their forces against the American forces and the U. N. forces in South Korea?

The INTERPRETER. Of course, I couldn't tell you to what degree the armaments in North Korea could be dangerous to South Korea or our allies. But I can only say that there is a strict collaboration between the Polish teams in the truce commission and the North Korean Communist Party.

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And these armaments are taking place and the Polish teams are doing everything in their power to cover those armaments before the world public opinion.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you know what currency makes up these special funds? Is it American currency or what currency?

The INTERPRETER. Not in Polish currency, but in different western currencies.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, do you know what Oscar Lange is doing now?

Oscar Lange, Mr. Chairman, was formerly an American citizen, who sometime late in the war and shortly after the war went over to Soviet Poland.

The INTERPRETER. I know him very well. Oscar Lange holds a very high position in the present Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I believe he passes as a Socialist. Is he a Socialist?

The INTERPRETER. He is a member of the central committee of the Polish Communist Party.

He is a member of the state council in Poland and altogether he is a very high official in Poland. Presently he is out of Poland. Presently he is in India performing a task of an economic adviser to the Indian Government. He spent a certain time in India also last year, and there he was helping the Indian Government form their economic plan.

Naturally, he represents the interests not only of the Polish Communists but of all the Soviet bloc in India.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, Mr. Bialer, we have been taking testimony in the Internal Security Subcommittee for the last 6 or 8 weeks on the repatriation campaign.

Have you had any experience with the Polish repatriation campaign?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; I have certain information in this respect. First, as far as the aim of repatriation is concerned, it is in the main an economic one. Repatriation has an aim, particularly political goals. They charge that repatriation is important from the internal and from the international point of view.

The party in Poland wants first of all the repatriation of the Polish intellectuals.

So far they consider in Warsaw that no great achievements took place as far as the return of intellectuals is concerned.

They are interested particularly in repatriation of those who left Poland after the war and went to the West. They wanted them to come back. For instance, the Polish sailors. There were several Polish sailors on the ship *Labor*, and they asked for asylum in the United States.

Some of them returned to Poland and then they were used in Poland for a very serious propaganda campaign.

Particularly I would like to stress that they want back those who left Poland after the war, in order to use them for propaganda. They do not care so much for the so-called old emigres.

As far as the methods are concerned, there is a special radio station called *Kraj*, The Country. There are also leaflets which are being sent out. This concerned the so-called old emigration, those people who left Poland before the Second World War.

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This kind of propaganda from Kraj, from leaflets, from the old emigration, exaggerates so much that even they go further than the official Communist propaganda, because they believe that the old emigrees would believe it.

As far as the new emigration is concerned, meaning the emigration of the Second World War and after the Second World War, there were mainly four methods used.

Mr. MORRIS. These are the four steps in their repatriation campaign?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; in working on them.

First of all, as far as the new emigration is concerned, the personal contacts play a very important role. So first they received individual letters from their families.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, did you personally engage in this repatriation campaign?

The INTERPRETER. These activities were carried on by the foreign section of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party. I collaborated closely with that section.

Mr. MORRIS. I see.

And you say the first means of getting people to repatriate is by personal contact, letters, and personal discussions?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. Altogether, personal contacts, they stress them very much.

So the first step, the first method, is those letters from their families. Here I want to say that those letters are genuine letters. They are really written by the families. Of course, they were enforced by the party.

Mr. MORRIS. They were enforced?

The INTERPRETER. They were enforced.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, the people had to write them?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. They were not written of their own initiative. They were ordered to write them.

It was organized; the whole campaign.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what is the second point?

The INTERPRETER. The second method is promises:

If you return to Poland, you will have a better job and you will make more money and you will have more opportunities than you have in the country in which you are living presently.

The third method is an appeal to ambition, to vanity, to a desire of a personal glory:

If you return to Poland, you will be famous; you will have opportunities to speak to the people.

The fourth method is simply blackmail, sheer blackmail.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you explain that?

The INTERPRETER. So here in this respect I would like to draw your attention to one thing. Before, the blackmail was a direct blackmail. A man would come to a prospective returnee and tell him, "If you do not return, we will say about you this and this." Now, this direct blackmail is not carried on anymore. More subtle methods are being used.

So now they learned not to speak so directly. So a man from the Embassy, for instance, would approach such a Polish emigrant and he will tell him, "We advise you to come back, Comrade. Remember, you have a family over there. You want them to be happy." They

do not finish their threat; this in order that it cannot be proved that they blackmailed the man.

Naturally, a man who is from Poland, even if the conversation is not finished, understands very well what the other man wants to tell him.

But legally, naturally, he cannot prove that he was blackmailed.

Mr. MORRIS. Were you in Poland when the Polish seamen returned last October?

The INTERPRETER. Who?

Mr. MORRIS. The Polish seamen who redefected, returned?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir. I was in Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us something about that?

The INTERPRETER. So far as those sailors, or seamen, were concerned, exactly these kinds of methods were used with regard to them.

Mr. MORRIS. And was that much of a propaganda victory for the Communists in Warsaw?

The INTERPRETER. I think that they are very successful in this kind of propaganda activities.

Mr. MORRIS. Was that particular one a success?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. It was a very great success and I doubt if all of you realize it in this country.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you know, a few years ago two Russian flyers, a man named Barsov and a man named Pirogov, both defected. In the course of time, one of them, Barsov, redefected. Now, we have heard from Mr. Petrov, in Australia, that Mr. Barsov was executed in the Soviet Union after he redefected. Do you know anything about that?

The INTERPRETER. No; I don't know anything about this fact. But I know something about another fact of the same nature.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us what that was?

The INTERPRETER. This concerns a certain Polish private who tried to go abroad who was caught and who was killed in Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. He was killed when his escape failed?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; after he tried to escape.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, we have not been able to get any verification of the information which Mr. Petrov has given, namely, that he had heard that Barsov had been executed after he went back to Russia. If so, it is an important fact for us to establish, Senator.

Would you tell us about the propaganda that was being made in Poland from sources in the United States such as the labor-research group and the output of the United Electrical and Radio Machine Workers in the United States?

The INTERPRETER. These two organizations which you mentioned, sir, they are fundamental, they are basic sources of anti-American propaganda, not only in Poland but all over the Soviet bloc.

If you are interested, I could give you countless instances in which statistics, for instance, of these two organizations are being used over there in an anti-American propaganda campaign.

For instance, materials prepared by the United Electrical Workers are mimeographed. They were sent to Poland; they were discussed at the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, and they were recommended then to different agencies for use in order to falsify life in America.

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I would like to indicate why the material of these two organizations is so important in Poland.

The party in Poland realized that many people in Poland do not believe them any more.

Then the party distributes the material prepared by these two organizations, saying, "You know, this is American material, prepared in America, written by Americans. We have nothing to do with it in this case." Of course, people believe it.

For instance, I remember there were discussions with Soviet officers, party workers, and others, and in these discussions very often, when the factual material given by the Soviet propaganda was challenged, the Soviets would say again, "Here we have material which is coming from the United States. You cannot put this in doubt." We quote it. And naturally, they close the mouth of anybody who does not believe their propaganda.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, will you identify for the record the Labor Research Association?

Mr. MANDEL. It has been cited by Attorney General Tom Clark on December 4, 1947. It is known as a direct auxiliary of the Communist Party. It publishes labor fact books and economic releases for the Communist press, and it is headed by two leading Communists, Grace Hutchins and Robert Dunn.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Mandel, you describe it as a direct auxiliary of the Communist Party. They do not bill themselves as such, though, do they?

Mr. MANDEL. No; they do not.

Mr. MORRIS. They do not acknowledge that they are a Communist source; do they?

Mr. MANDEL. They do not.

Mr. MORRIS. Has he finished?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir. I explained to him what you were saying.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, I wondered, were you in Poland when Swiatlow's defection and subsequent broadcasts were beamed to Poland?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir; I was in Poland at this time.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know Swiatlow at all before he defected?

The INTERPRETER. No; I never met him.

Mr. MORRIS. What was the effect of his defection in Poland?

The INTERPRETER. In this respect, first, it is very obvious to me that one could not say that Swiatlow's defection was a cause for all personal changes which are taking place in Poland now.

But naturally, his defection contributed to these changes very lately.

The first importance of Swiatlow's defection was that the party and the Government had been forced to reveal very many details concerning those men they liquidated later which otherwise they would not be forced to reveal.

In addition, all this which American radios, different stations from abroad, all this information supplied on Swiatlow's material, of course, they opened the eyes of many people in Poland concerning the real nature of the Communist Government in Poland.

In this respect, for instance, I remember such an interesting detail: The foreign radio is beamed generally in Warsaw. But you can listen to it in the suburbs of Warsaw. At the time of Swiatlow's

broadcasts to Poland, there were literally huge crowds of people who were trying to get to the suburban houses evidently to listen on the radio to what Swiatlow was saying.

Swiatlow's defection and the broadcasts he was giving here caused great nervousness among the governmental and party officials.

Could I assure you that if Bierut were ill and had heart trouble at that time, no doubt one of the causes of his heart trouble was Swiatlow.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you recall the visit of Boris Polevoj to the United States? He had a group of political writers. I think it was the summer of 1955.

The INTERPRETER. There were several things which are interesting in respect to Polevoj and Bierazkow—there are several things which I would like to mention. They gave interviews here in the United States. The nature of those interviews was such that they were not published in Poland. They were not allowed to be published in Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean, what they said over here—

The INTERPRETER. Was not allowed to be published in Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. Why was that? Was it so obviously false?

The INTERPRETER. The reason why those interviews could not be published in Poland was this: Polevoj gave so many lies concerning the life behind the Iron Curtain that if his lies would be reprinted in Poland, evidently not only would nobody believe in it, but this would result in a contrary opinion. The public opinion would learn how the Polish and the Soviet regimes are misguiding the Western World.

For instance, I remember such a case: Polevoj's interview was mimeographed and distributed among the members of the central committee of the Communist Party in the district of Cracow, and this was distributed only among the party workers. When the party authorities in Warsaw learned about it, they criticized very much the decision of the party organization in Cracow. They criticized the activities of the director of propaganda of the Communist Party in Cracow.

It was the first case in which an interview of a Communist given abroad, outside of the Soviet bloc, was banned within the Soviet bloc.

Chairman EASTLAND. We will take the rest of it in executive session.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, Senator Eastland has to terminate the hearing at this particular time. He has asked if we would continue on to take the testimony in executive session later on this afternoon, and then put that executive session testimony in the public record at some date later in the week.

Chairman EASTLAND. Mr. Bialer, we will take the rest of your testimony in executive session. It will later be released.

I want to thank you, sir. I think your testimony points up the importance of defectors and how helpful they are to our Government. They are something that we should certainly encourage.

(Whereupon, at 2:55 p. m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene in room 319 at 3:05 p. m.)

Mr. MORRIS. This is a continuation.

Mr. Bialer, do you know anything about schools of international communism?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Would you tell us about it?

The INTERPRETER. I will tell you about those schools I know personally.

There is a school in the suburbs of East Berlin where they train Communist workers for Western Germany.

This is a very secret school, guarded by the police. Nobody has any access to it.

The school had been organized in the woods, and it is completely unavailable to any kind of public.

I lectured at that school in 1955; in June 1955.

The subject of the education in that school is, first, how to carry on Communist activities in the West; then also other things like military training included.

In respect to the military training, I remember, for instance, in 1955 that there were special courses on how to get into the Army in Western Germany. There were classes, lectures, on how to get into and work with the Western German Army.

Those who lecture in that school are both Communists from the Western part of Germany, and of course, Communists from East Germany.

The second school—

Mr. MORRIS. What was the name of that first school?

The INTERPRETER. This was a secret school without any name.

This was a school just for the party apparatus in Eastern Germany, for the party members from West Germany trained in that school.

The second school I was acquainted with personally was a higher school, a party school in Moscow.

The school is housed in the same building where, before, the Comintern was operating, the schools of the Comintern.

At that school, which is mainly for the Soviet Communists, there are also special groups consisting of Western Communists, of the Communists outside of the Soviet bloc.

There are classes where there are German, East and West German, Communists, French, and others, Polish, Czechoslovak, German, East and West.

As far as Western Communists are concerned, there are not as many of them, and they form special classes for them, and also, from the conspirational point of view, probably it would not be good to have large classes for them.

This is why this kind of Communists in the West, they are distributed under false names among other groups in the groups of the Russian Communists.

Mr. MORRIS. And where was this second group held?

The INTERPRETER. In Moscow.

Mr. MORRIS. In what building?

The INTERPRETER. I don't remember the street; in the building where formerly the Comintern schools were operating.

The fact that in that building there is this particular school is public knowledge. Of course, people do not know what happens there.

The fact of the existence of the school is publicly known.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you know about the case of Herman Field?

The INTERPRETER. Well, I would like to give you some information about what the party people were saying after Herman Field was released.

So first, the second man in importance at that time in the Communist Party, Berman, was saying that Herman Field was a naive, innocent man, that he was arrested unjustly.

Mr. MORRIS. Unjustly from the Communist point of view?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; that he was not guilty; that he was naive, and not guilty.

Mr. MORRIS. "Guilt" in this case being spying for the Americans?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

The second version concerning Herman Field was being spread in more narrow party circles, and it was spread by Ochab, the present first secretary of the Polish Communist Party.

And his version was such that the crimes committed by the previous administration were of such magnitude that not only innocent people could have been arrested but also that people who were guilty, their affairs were so mixed up, so confused, that they had to be released.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you ever see Herman Field?

The INTERPRETER. No, sir; only pictures.

But I met his wife at some friends' before he was arrested.

Mr. MORRIS. What year was that?

The INTERPRETER. Most probably—it is difficult to remember—it was 1948.

I saw her in the house of a certain George Durac and his wife. It was in the suburbs of Warsaw, called Zoliborz.

By the way, the wife of that Durac was later arrested and spent several years in jail because of her connections with Herman Field.

She was a secretary to Berman, and she contacted Field and Berman.

Mr. MORRIS. Did you know anything about the Katyn Forest massacre?

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

There were very few people, actives of the Polish Communist Party, who wouldn't believe that the Russians did it.

Their opinion, nevertheless, was divided, of those who believed the Russians did it, and it was divided following two lines: Some of them were say that the Russians were right doing it; others were saying that the Russians were wrong having done it.

Mr. MORRIS. But they all agreed that the Russians did it?

The INTERPRETER. But all agreed that the Russians did it.

But I must stress until I left Poland, no efforts were seen to reveal it or to declare that the Russians did it. On the contrary, if anyone would make such statements openly, the party would immediately suppress the statement.

Mr. MORRIS. Where were you at that time? That was in 1940, was it not?

The INTERPRETER. Katyn, 1940. I was in Poland at that time.

Mr. MORRIS. And you know nothing about it personally?

Mr. BIALER. No.

Mr. MORRIS. Could you tell us something about the fall of Molotov and the rise of Shepilov?

The INTERPRETER. First, Molotov fell, not in June 1956, but rather in July 1955.

In July 1955 there was a plenum of the central committee, and at that plenum practically Molotov was separated from any important work of the party.

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Mr. MORRIS. How do you know that?

The INTERPRETER. I know it from the minutes of that particular plenum, which was sent to the party in Poland, to the political bureau of the Polish Communist Party.

As it was indicated by the party at that time, the main reason for Molotov's downfall was his disagreement with the Soviet policy with regard to Yugoslavia.

There were also other reasons as given by the party why Molotov had to go. Of course, the most important reason was, among others, the personal struggle for power within the party.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say that Molotov's position with respect to Yugoslavia was the reason, what was his position with respect to Yugoslavia?

The INTERPRETER. I mean that Molotov did not approve of establishing party relations with Yugoslavia.

He was saying that the Yugoslavian Party was not a Communist Party and consequently there was no sense to establishing relations.

Khrushchev did not agree with Molotov. He agreed with him as to the nature of the Yugoslavian Communist Party, but his argument was that if we do not establish relations with them, we will be unable to get them into the Soviet bloc.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, do you know to what extent the absorption of Yugoslavia back into the Soviet bloc, to what extent that has taken place?

The INTERPRETER. Throughout the last year there were efforts being made for establishing relations between different countries of the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia.

In order to get this rapprochement, for instance, orders were given in the Polish Communist Party against any criticism of Tito.

Mr. MORRIS. You mean the Polish Communist Party was forbidden to criticize Tito?

The INTERPRETER. To criticize Tito.

Mr. MORRIS. In what year was this, now?

The INTERPRETER. In 1955.

I have in mind public criticism of Tito.

As far as the actual state of affairs was concerned, it was different.

I ran across 2 members of the Polish delegation, 2 chairmen of the Polish delegations to Yugoslavia. The name of one was Wolynsky, and the second one was Wolpe.

After their return to Poland, openly they restrained themselves from any criticism of Tito and Yugoslavia.

At the same time, there was a meeting of the active of the Polish Central Committee, and at that meeting the same two men were criticizing very sharply Yugoslavia and Tito.

The same applies to the economic state of affairs in Yugoslavia. In general, I would say the policy was such:

"Tito is a friend; Tito is an enemy."

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, Tito no longer represents Titoism?

The INTERPRETER. No. This means that Tito, as the chief of state, and Yugoslavia, as a country, the Soviet Union wants to get them into collaboration, but the system which is prevailing in Yugoslavia, they do not want to have this system in other satellite countries.

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Until I left Poland, this border separating the Soviet communism and Yugoslavian type communism was still not passed. And as far as I remember, this border is the limit of the so-called political thaw in Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. I did not understand that last.

The INTERPRETER. This distinction between the Communist Party in the Communist bloc and the system prevailing now in Yugoslavia, the distinction between these two, this is the limit of the so-called thaw.

Mr. MORRIS. That is, the limit of the thaw?

The INTERPRETER. The limit of the thaw.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what then is your interpretation of Tito's recent visit to Moscow, currently?

The INTERPRETER. Before I answer your question, sir, I would like to say this:

At that meeting in July 1955 I remember Mikoyan at a certain moment told Molotov:

At the present not only do we hope to bring Tito to our Soviet bloc; we are sure we will get him.

I think that this was not achieved yet.

So the last visit of Tito in Moscow in a way is a payment for the Soviet benevolence, for the downgrading of Stalin, for the last stage of the Soviet policy.

But as far as I know, still Yugoslavia did not become a Soviet satellite. It is still independent.

Mr. MORRIS. That will be all at this time.

(Whereupon, at 3:50 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES

FRIDAY, JUNE 29, 1956

UNITED STATES SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS, OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D. C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p. m., in room P-63, United States Capitol, Senator Herman Welker presiding.

Present: Senator Welker.

Also present: Robert Morris, chief counsel, Benjamin Mandel, research director; William A. Rusher, administrative counsel.

Senator WELKER. The hearing will come to order. The first witness will be sworn.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you swear, Dr. Karski, please, before swearing the witness.

Senator WELKER. You will be sworn as the interpreter.

Do you solemnly swear that you will take the questions propounded to you by the committee in English and correctly translate them into the Polish language to the witness and his answers in the Polish language to you will then be interpreted by you truthfully and honestly in the English language to the subcommittee, so help you God?

Mr. KARSKI. I do.

Senator WELKER. Mr. Bialer, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BIALER. I do.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer has testified previously before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. He has been recalled today because of the revolt that took place at Poznan yesterday. He is trying to determine for this public record whether there are any implications or aspects of the uprising in Poznan may have a bearing on our internal security in the United States.

I wonder if you would repeat for the record, very briefly, Mr. Bialer, the 2 or 3 top positions you held in the Polish Communist Party in the Polish Government before defecting to the United States on January 31 of this year?

TESTIMONY OF SEWERYN BIALER, AS INTERPRETED BY
DR. JAN KARSKI

The INTERPRETER. I was a functionary of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party. I was one of the leaders of the anti-

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Western propaganda in Poland. I was the first secretary of the party organization in the highest ideological party schools in Poland. I was an ideological adviser to the party central organ, People's Tribune; and I held several other positions in the ideological sector of political life.

Mr. MORRIS. I think you told us once before, Mr. Bialer, that you were one of a group of three top propagandists in charge of anti-American and anti-Western propaganda.

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. Are you acquainted with, are you conversant with the revolt that took place in Poznan in the last few days?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; I know what was given by the press.

Mr. MORRIS. How much of the situation in and about Poznan and Warsaw generally are you conversant with, with respect to this particular uprising?

The INTERPRETER. Could you give me, sir, a few minutes so I could give my evaluation of the recent happenings in Poland?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; that is what we would very much like to have.

The INTERPRETER. The last 3 years were being called all over in Poland as the period of the thaw. In that period, really, certain liberalization of the Communist terror was taking place.

Mr. MORRIS. You say there was a liberalization of the Polish Communist terror taking place?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir; it was a liberalization of the life in Poland and liberalization of the Communist mass terror in Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. This is as of what time?

The INTERPRETER. That period after the death of Stalin, the beginning was after the liquidation of Beria. The first period, from 1953 until the end of 1954, I would call it a period of the thaw in baby clothes.

Mr. MORRIS. I didn't understand that.

The INTERPRETER. Period of the thaw in those baby clothes.

Senator WELKER. Let's do a retake on that one.

Mr. MORRIS. The Senator didn't understand it either, sir.

The INTERPRETER. It was the period of the liberalization of the life in Poland in its primitive first original stage.

The second period was from the end of 1954 until the time I left Poland—and I would call that period the medium stage, when the thaw was spreading all over Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. What was spreading over?

The INTERPRETER. The thaw. The liberalization of Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. Thaw. That is an expression Mr. Bialer has used previously in which he refers to the relaxation of the terror on the part of the Polish Communists.

You have referred that from the period, from 1954 until the time you left Poland, which was on January 31, 1956, that this was the intermediate stage, this was where the thaw was beginning to show?

The INTERPRETER. Spreading; yes. The present stage of that relaxation period I would call it a stage of a stormy period.

Mr. MORRIS. This is the third period of relaxation.

The INTERPRETER. The present one.

Mr. MORRIS. You describe that as a stormy period.

The INTERPRETER. Stormy period; yes.

I was asking myself a question and I am sure that others in Poland were asking themselves that question, "What is the origin of that so-called relaxation in Poland?" There is only one answer, which I could prove by hundreds of facts. Some of those facts concern the highest party authorities.

The short answer is such, the essence of the present period of the so-called liberalization is unprecedented in this history of communism, pressure exercised by the Communists themselves on the party leadership for more relaxation, and secondly the pressure—

Mr. MORRIS. See if we understand the first one?

The essence of this relaxation is the unprecedented demand for liberalization, on the part of the Communists themselves against the Party leaders?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir. That is the first one. The second aspect is the pressure of the nation, of the people, on the government for the same purpose.

Mr. MORRIS. And the second aspect of it is the people themselves, as opposed to the Communists, are also exerting pressure on the Polish leaders for a liberalization?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

I would like to give you some facts concerning such a matter, how the leadership of the party was opposing the pressure for liberalization, and how the leadership of the party was forced to cede step by step to liberalize the life.

Mr. MORRIS. This now, if I may understand your testimony, is factual. This is from your own personal experience with the Polish Communists?

The INTERPRETER. It is; I said, on the basis of my personal experiences, experiences particularly in the last 3 years. I was taking part in these activities.

Mr. MORRIS. You say that, on the basis of this experience, there was opposition, on the part of the party leaders, to pressure for liberalization?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. And you are going to tell us about this opposition on the part of the party leaders to the liberalization?

The INTERPRETER. Naturally, this problem is a very complex one, and I tried to write and elaborate on it and several pages took place. I will try to be as concise as possible.

I will give you the first example. The Minister of Security and the main oppressor in Poland, Radkiewicz, R-a-d-k-i-e-w-i-c-z.

Mr. MORRIS. That is R-a-d-k-i-e-w-i-c-z?

The INTERPRETER. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. He was the Minister of—

The INTERPRETER. Of Security.

As at the beginning of 1954, after the crimes committed by the Security became known, an enormous pressure by the party memberships, as well as by the people as a whole, was being exercised. The pressure was that Radkiewicz had to go.

Mr. MORRIS. He was eliminated?

The INTERPRETER. The pressure was to eliminate him.

Mr. MORRIS. Yes.

The INTERPRETER. Until the end of 1954, at all party meetings, and I know since I participated in those meetings, the party leadership

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was opposing such demands; was opposing even a discussion on this problem.

At the very end of 1954, under the pressure even of the activists of the Communist Party, the leadership was forced to dismiss Radkiewicz as a Minister of Security and to demote him to a post of a Minister of Agriculture.

Mr. MORRIS. May I repeat that again.

As a result of the pressure exerted on the party leaders, including the pressure on the part of the leading activists of the party, the party leaders were forced to depose Radkiewicz and give him the assignment of the Minister of Agriculture?

The INTERPRETER. That's right.

Mr. MORRIS. When was he deposed?

The INTERPRETER. The very end of 1954.

However, even after that dismissal from the position of Minister of Security to the position of Minister of Agriculture, still he retained his position as a member of the Politburo of the Polish Communist Party.

Mr. MORRIS. And even in his position as Minister of Agriculture, he retained his position as a member of the Politburo?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

After that event, the pressure within the party to eliminate Radkiewicz from the Politburo was continuing. I participated in several party meetings where the party membership was demanding openly a final elimination of Radkiewicz from any post.

Mr. MORRIS. Now you participated in Communist Party meetings where the rank and file of the party continued their pressure to have Radkiewicz—his membership in the Politburo taken away from him?

The INTERPRETER. That is correct.

Again, I want to stress at that period the leadership of the party, Bierut, B-i-e-r-u-t; Berman, B-e-r-m-a-n; and Ochab, O-c-h-a-b, were doing their best to preserve Radkiewicz and to preserve his influence.

Nevertheless, the summer of 1955 came, and at the secret meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, Radkiewicz, supposedly on his own initiative, resigned from his post.

Mr. MORRIS. May I recapitulate. In spite of the pressure on the part of the three top leaders of the Polish party, Bierut, Berman, and Ochab, despite the fact that they wanted him to remain on in the summer of 1955, at a secret meeting, a secret Communist meeting, Radkiewicz offered his resignation?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. I am going to get to a little more current events. You are aware, are you, of the revolt going on in Poland as of this moment at Poznan?

The INTERPRETER. I was giving you certain facts in order to make a background for the present happenings.

Senator WELKER. I understand that.

Will you answer my question? You are aware of that revolt going on now?

The INTERPRETER. Naturally, I possess only information which I received from the American press. I do not have any other direct information.

Senator WELKER. I think we are all working from what we have read in the press.

Now, based upon your experience in the Communist Party, did you expect the Polish people to arise and have a revolution as early as of this date?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; I was expecting them to a great extent, and in addition, too, I consider that they are a logical outcome of the previous development of the situation in Poland.

Senator WELKER. There is no question in your mind but what the people in Poland are God-fearing, freedom-loving people and want their freedom restored to them?

The INTERPRETER. I have no doubt, sir, of any kind to this question.

Senator WELKER. What significance do you attach to the press release that the Polish people in their uprising were crying, "We want bread; bread." Does that mean that they were hungry, that the Communist Party was not feeding them?

The INTERPRETER. Yes; they were claiming the amelioration of the economic situation in Poland, their standard of living which is presently extremely low in Poland, tragically low.

Senator WELKER. Tragically low?

The INTERPRETER. Tragically low.

Senator WELKER. And the Communists work the Poles very hard, do they?

The INTERPRETER. The workers in Poland work extremely hard under orders of the party, I was making certain statistics while in Poland. The standard of living of the Polish workers, according to my research, is $3\frac{1}{2}$ times lower than the standard of living of the workers in Germany—Western Germany.

Mr. MORRIS. The standard of living is $3\frac{1}{2}$ times lower than the standard of living of workers in Western Germany?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

However, I would like to draw your attention, sir, that what is happening in Poznan should not be considered only as an economic activity. The background is economic. However, every activity of this kind in a Communist-controlled state has political aspirations in view, and are being suppressed as political opposition.

Senator WELKER. Now, they are seeking freedom. Isn't that correct?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. I notice in the afternoon edition of a prominent Washington newspaper that the Warsaw radio announced that 38 people were killed and 270 wounded in this well-organized revolt at Poznan.

Do you assume for a moment, sir, that this uprising has ended as of now, or do you think that it will still be brewing and last for years to come until they get their freedom?

The INTERPRETER. I believe that it is very possible that riots of this kind, although on a smaller scale, will be repeated in other localities. However, I believe that riots to such an extent will not be repeated in the immediate future.

Senator WELKER. That last answer was—I didn't get that.

The INTERPRETER. That riots so serious as those in Poznan, on a mass scale, will not be repeated elsewhere.

Mr. MORRIS. You say there will be some other riots, but not of the extent of this one.

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Senator WELKER. And that is because the people of Poland have nothing but their fists to fight with in the form of arms. Is that it?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir; first of all because the Polish nation from the times of the end of the war, had no possibilities to express their will in any way. They couldn't vote, and they have no other technical way to express their will.

Senator WELKER. And of course they have little to look forward to when they, with their hands, have to combat tanks of the size you see here in the picture of the newspaper I am showing you, huge tanks which are shooting down those people which are uprising.

The INTERPRETER. Yes, this is the reason.

Senator WELKER. Now, directing your attention to the newspaper which I am sending you, Mr. Witness, the second picture after the picture of the tanks and the people, I am asking you whether or not there is any significance to the flag that is flying over the people, which would appear to the Senator from Idaho to be of rather serious concern. Is there any significance to that flag flying there?

Mr. KARSKI. May I read the caption to him?

Senator WELKER. Go right ahead, Doctor.

The INTERPRETER. The Polish flag has two colors, white and red, the national Polish flag. It looks to me that this flag has also some two colors; and it looks like white and some blood stain which probably symbolizes to them the national flag.

Mr. MORRIS. When you say the Polish national flag, do you mean the national flag of the current government of Poland or the previous government?

The INTERPRETER. The previous government has the same flag, except the same flag as the flag before the war. But nevertheless, for the Polish nation, the white and the red color symbolizes the Polish national color and symbolizes the freedom of Poland.

Senator WELKER. Now, based upon your experience as a former Communist agent in Poland, based upon the knowledge you have learned from the press, is it a safe assumption that what is going on in Poland yesterday and today—and we hope forever, without the loss of life and injury to those patriots—would it be safe to say that other freedom-loving satellite countries have the same unrest and same freedom urge that the Poles are evidencing now?

The INTERPRETER. Before I left Poland, I was in touch with other nations behind the Iron Curtain, and I came to the conclusion that the desire for freedom is the same, although that campaign for achieving more liberalization was carried on in Poland on a larger scale than in other satellite countries.

Mr. MORRIS. You say the desire for liberalization and the willingness to express pressure to bring about liberalization was stronger in Poland than it was in the other satellite countries, even though based on your travels in the other satellite countries, you did recognize there was this desire for liberalization and this unrest?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir.

Senator WELKER. I have one concluding question, Doctor, that you might interpret to the witness.

I will ask you if it isn't a fact that the Polish freedom-loving people who have suffered, some killed, some wounded and some very unhappy, and those who have been in this revolt as they call it—had they had

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the arms or the armaments or the tools to work with—I will ask you if it isn't a fact that they would have turned against the Communist and shot him dead wherever they saw him in Poland?

The INTERPRETER. Well, I couldn't tell you, of course, if they were armed or not in this particular riot in Poznan, since I have no way to know, but I can tell you, on the basis of my personal experience, that Polish Communist police do not hesitate to kill people in this kind of riot anywhere.

Senator WELKER. I think we have misunderstood each other. I am referring now to this fact, would the Polish people who have been revolting against this tyranny—would they have any reluctance to shoot down the Communists and the secret police had they had the arms to do it with?

The INTERPRETER. In the present situation, where there is no democracy and no rights, and where the governmental control over the people is extended to all walks of life—first of all, there is no possibility that the people would get arms. It is physically impossible.

Senator WELKER. I understand that, but mine was a hypothetical question based upon the fact if they could get arms, would they use them?

The INTERPRETER. If they had arms, I firmly believe that the great part of the Polish nation, most of the Polish nation, would fight against the regime.

Mr. MORRIS. You believe that if they did have arms, a great part of the Polish people, in fact most of the Polish people, would take up arms against the Polish Communist leaders?

The INTERPRETER. Yes. I mean the part greater than that those who support communism.

Mr. MORRIS. It is the majority.

The INTERPRETER. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, I wonder if you could tell us what happened after the secret meeting in 1955 when the pressure became so great that Mr. Radkiewicz had to resign from the membership in the Politburo in the Polish Communist Party?

The INTERPRETER. May I draw your attention, sir, that Radkiewicz resigned from his position in the middle of 1955, but the party leadership withheld that information from the people and from the party membership. I am sure that even today, the people in Poland and the party membership do not know that he was dismissed as early as in the middle of 1955.

Senator WELKER. I think that would be a rather wholesome thing to broadcast to the people of Poland, don't you, that he was forced to resign in the middle of the summer of 1955?

The INTERPRETER. I tried my best, sir, exactly to do this.

Mr. MORRIS. Then, does that complete the background or do you have more aspects of this background leading up to the interpretation of the present situation?

The INTERPRETER. From those examples which I gave you, and I have hundreds of other examples, the main point is that the Polish nation and the party membership are continuously exercising a pressure for more liberalization. The party leadership is and was opposing that pressure and only being forced to accept the principle that more liberalization should be introduced.

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The Poznan riot was one of many efforts on the part of the Polish workers to attain, to force the party to bring more liberalization and higher standards of living, and a change in the national position in Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. Your interpretations, Mr. Bialer, that the ever-extending pressure for liberalization, which you have described in great detail through the years, has been the direct cause or contributing cause to the present uprising?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, I am deeply convinced that it was so.

Mr. MORRIS. Does the fact that the Polish national flag was unfurled during the course of this demonstration indicate to you that the uprising was political in content rather than the demand for food?

The INTERPRETER. Those riots basically were political, although, I repeat, under a Communist regime, economic demands and economic situation is a result of the political Communist rule.

Mr. MORRIS. I wonder if I might ask this question—is there any possibility that this revolt may have been falsely stimulated by the Communist leaders in order to bring out any underground resistance that may exist in the Communist regime?

The INTERPRETER. I don't believe, sir, in this. The price which the regime is paying for these riots, and the price is the loss of authority in Poland and the revelation before the whole world how terrible the situation is in Poland—the price is so great that they wouldn't be willing to pay it.

Mr. MORRIS. The answer is the price is so great—in other words, a revelation to the whole world how bad the situation is in Communist Poland and the fact that there is so much resentment against the regime—that the price would not be worth the effort. You do not believe in that?

The INTERPRETER. Absolutely, I do not believe it.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you believe the Warsaw radio would announce that the revolt was of such proportions—38 killed and 270 wounded—if the revolt were not serious?

The INTERPRETER. The fact that Warsaw admits that 38 people were killed and 270 wounded indicates to me, on the basis of my knowledge of the Communist methods, that even the expression "serious" is too mild; too delicate. It means that this was a bloody battle which was waged in Poznan.

Mr. MORRIS. Do you know anything of a revolt that took place between the Polish people and the Soviet occupation forces in a town Szczecin in 1951? I believe that is the Polish for Stettin, is it not?

The INTERPRETER. Yes, sir; I have knowledge about it.

Mr. MORRIS. Will you tell us briefly what happened at that time?

The INTERPRETER. In 1951, a Soviet officer shot a Polish lady. This provoked an outstanding part of the Polish population in Stettin, an outrage and outbreak, which was being hidden by the Communist regime for many years. As a result, there were outbreaks in Stettin; there were public demonstrations, and naturally, as a consequence, reprisals on the part of the regime. All of them were being concealed from the Polish people. However, I would like to stress here that at that time, it was much easier for the regime to curb those riots because the security organs were much stronger than they are today.

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Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, could you tell us what you feel the United States policies should be now, with respect to this expressed desire on the part of the Polish people to gain the liberation of control.

The INTERPRETER. First of all, sir, I believe that the most important thing in this field is this: Let the American people convince the Polish people that they first sympathize with them, and secondly, that the Americans will never reconcile themselves with the loss of freedom in Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. Let the American people know that they sympathize with the Polish people and that they will never reconcile themselves to the loss of freedom on the part of the Polish people.

The INTERPRETER. Let the Polish people know it.

Mr. MORRIS. Let the Polish people know that the Americans sympathize with their feeling that they will never reconcile themselves to the loss of their freedom?

The INTERPRETER. I want to stress very, very strongly this fact. The Polish Communist Party and the Polish Communist regime are doing everything possible to silence the Western World and the Americans not to let them—to stop them—saying the truth about the situation in Poland.

Mr. MORRIS. The Communist leaders are doing everything possible in order to cause the leaders of the West and the people of the West not to express themselves on these subjects.

The INTERPRETER. Yes, to such a degree that I would put it in such a slogan it amounts to this: The Communist leaders in Poland are saying to the Western World, very smartly, very cleverly, "Don't you criticize us in your radios and we will not jam your broadcasts."

Mr. MORRIS. Should we continue to criticize them?

The INTERPRETER. Naturally, if we stop the campaign of criticizing them and revealing the truth, this would mean a great help to them in their oppression of the Polish people.

Mr. MORRIS. And therefore, a policy which would cause us to soften our criticism of the Polish overlords would be a bad policy for us to pursue?

The INTERPRETER. I think that such a policy would be a very terrible policy as far as the Polish people are concerned, and in consequence would be a bad policy for the United States.

Senator WELKER. Now, Mr. Witness, and Doctor, we thank you very much for your testimony here today. We are now going to conclude this phase of the hearing. It may be necessary that we reopen a hearing at a later date.

The acting chairman wants to recognize the fact that the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate is honored indeed to have today as its guest, Arthur Bliss Lane, former Ambassador to Poland and his lovely wife. As all of us know, Arthur Bliss Lane wrote the famous book, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*. There has come to my attention a press release this great man gave when he heard of the activities on the part of the oppressed people of Poland. I am going to read that into the record, if it is all right with you, Mr. Lane.

Mr. LANE. Yes, sir.

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Senator WELKER. I quote Arthur Bliss Lane in a statement he made yesterday:

The reports which have come over the radio today regarding the riots in Poznan, the largest city in what used to be German Poland, are highly significant. The fact that the Polish official radio confirms these reports emphasizes the seriousness of the situation. This courageous action in Poznan may quite probably be followed by other acts of patriotic violence against Communist despotism not only in Poland but in other captive nations as well.

Probably the Poles have taken advantage of the recent dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and the criticism of Khrushchev by foreign Communist parties which surely have been communicated to the various captive states, including Poland. The spirit of liberty of the Poles, which never in history has been completely quenched, has finally burst forth in a brave, although perhaps for the moment futile, attempt at liberation from their Communist masters who have been under the heel of Moscow since the puppet Lublin government was formed in Poland under Stalin's direction on July 21, 1944. Rokossovsky, the Minister of Defense, formerly a marshal in the Soviet Army, who was appointed to his present position by Stalin, will undoubtedly put down the insurrection with customary Communist cruelty.

But regardless of the inevitable loss of life, the attempt is all to the good. We did not gain our independence without Washington having been willing to risk his life as well as those of his men.

I do not place any credence in the relationship of this uprising to the recent visit of Tito to Moscow. I am not as naive as some persons in this country who hold to the fallacious theory that Tito represents a different type of communism of the Trotskyist or Bukharin school. All forms of communism are the same. They are aimed at the destruction of all we hold dear: democracy, religion, and liberty, and specifically the overthrow of the United States.

Therefore, all Americans should hail this bold revolution. It is in the interest of the liberation of Eastern Europe and of the security of the United States. God bless the Polish people.

Arthur Bliss Lane, that was a profound statement made by you yesterday. On behalf of Chairman Eastland and the entire subcommittee and its staff, we want to thank you for permitting us to use that as part of the record in this hearing, which is a hearing following one of the crucial things in the history of the modern world.

Mr. MORRIS. We may have a staff session with Mr. Bialer and if we learn anything at that staff session, we can put it in the public record.

Mr. BIALER (through the interpreter). May I add just one sentence, sir?

Senator WELKER. Yes.

The INTERPRETER. Could I tell you, I would symbolize what is happening now in Poland in such a way: There is a legend in Poland about a witch who liberated certain forces and then was unable to control them any more. This is what is happening in Poland. The Communist regime liberated certain forces in Poland to speak, and now it looks they can't control them any more.

Senator WELKER. Thank you very much.

The committee now stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 2:55 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

(The following letters from Chairman Eastland to Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., were ordered into the record at a meeting of the subcommittee on June 21:)

HON. HERBERT BROWNELL, JR.,
Attorney General of the United States, Department of Justice,
Washington 25, D. C.

JUNE 8, 1956.

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: On June 8 the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee heard the testimony of Seweryn Bialer, who was until recently a

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leading activist and propagandist for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland. He testified with regard to a wide range of subjects, including the activities of one Henry Podolski. His testimony concerning Podolski follows:

"Mr. MORRIS. Do you know Henry Podolski?

"Mr. MORRIS (turning to the chairman). Mr. Chairman, Henry Podolski was the former editor in chief of Glos Ludowy, a Polish-Communist paper published in Detroit.

WITNESS (through interpreter). Yes; I know Henry Podolski. Henry Podolski has two main assignments presently in Poland. The first one is to work in the campaign of repatriation of the Polish emigres, postwar emigres, in the West, and the second, to instruct the American paper People's Voice in Detroit.

"Mr. MORRIS. You mean he is still running the Detroit newspaper?

"WITNESS (through interpreter). This paper receives strict instructions from Poland, and he is the man who is sending them."

According to our records Glos Ludowy (People's Voice) is a Polish language newspaper, published weekly at 5853 Chene Street, Detroit, Mich. It is the official organ of the Polonia Society of the International Workers Order, which has been cited by the Attorney General as "one of the strongest Communist organizations." Henry Podolski was formerly its editor in chief. Throughout its existence Glos Ludowy has never failed to follow the line of the Communist Party, as a study of its issues will show.

In the light of this testimony, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee feels that a new problem has been posed which we present to you for such action as may in your judgment be warranted: namely, the existence in this country of a publication conducted under the proven direction of an agent of the Communist Government of Poland.

Sincerely,

(Signed) JAMES O. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

JUNE 18, 1956.

HON. HERBERT BROWNELL, Jr.,
Attorney General of the United States, Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I write this letter to ask your assistance in a matter that constitutes a serious present threat to the internal security of the United States.

Seweryn Bialer, who was a leading Polish Communist until his defection a few months ago, recently told the Internal Security Subcommittee that propaganda prepared by the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers Union in the United States is the most effective propaganda device being used today by the Polish Communist leaders against their people. This propaganda is directed against America, and is further being used to keep the Polish people in bondage.

Two of the leaders of this union have been James Maties and James Lustig. Both have been demonstrated to be Communists and both are the subject of denaturalization proceedings. I believe that your office filed denaturalization suits against them on February 13, 1952, and on December 16, 1952, respectively. Since that time apparently nothing has been done to enable the immigration authorities to follow up on their deportation proceedings.

There is also the case of Constantine Radzi, who our record shows has been a member of the control or disciplinary committee of the Communist Party. Radzi was observed watching one of our hearings in New York in 1952, and was subpoenaed to testify. In that case, both the Immigration Service and the Department of Justice acted expeditiously and filed a denaturalization proceeding on December 17, 1952, against Radzi. Since that time apparently nothing has been done on this case. Radzi is not even on bail, and is pursuing his work of undermining our Government without molestation.

I further call your attention to the case of Louis Weinstock, against whom suit was filed on January 22, 1953, and to the cases of almost a score of other Communists who are still engaged in trying to destroy our way of life.

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May we have your assurance that the Department of Justice is taking all possible steps to expedite the denaturalization and deportation of the named individuals, and of others in the same position?

With kindest regards, I am,
Sincerely yours,

(Signed) JAMES O. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

(An exchange of letters between Chairman Eastland and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, together with a letter to Senator Walter F. George, and a cable message to which reference is made were ordered into the record at a subcommittee meeting on July 18, 1956. The text of these documents follows:)

JULY 5, 1956.

HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Enclosed herewith, for your information, is a copy of a cable which Robert Morris, chief counsel of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, has received from Hon. William C. Wentworth, member of the Australian Parliament and member of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. I am also enclosing a copy of my letter of today's date to Hon. Walter F. George as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, transmitting a copy of this cable to him with the request that it be brought to the attention of his committee.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) JAMES O. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

JULY 5, 1956.

HON. WALTER F. GEORGE,
*Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Honorable William C. Wentworth, Member of the Australian Parliament and member of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, has transmitted the enclosed cable to Robert Morris, chief counsel of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Inasmuch as it bears on matters related to our foreign policy, I am transmitting herewith a copy of this cable, with the request that you place it before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The Australian Parliamentary Affairs Committee is made up of 13 members. The fact that 12 of these members have signed the within cable would indicate that their sentiments represent committee thinking.

Very sincerely yours,

[S] JAMES O. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

[Telegram]

JULY 3, 1956.

ROBERT MORRIS,
*Chief Counsel, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Washington:*

Twelve members of Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, including myself, have signed the following statement for press statement begins the massacres and mass arrest in Poznan show that Poland is still a police state whose people are kept in subjection to totalitarian terror.

Public comment from Communist leaders in other Soviet satellites to the effect that the Polish uprising proved the need for greater party vigilance is at least an indication that this is still the normal method of government throughout the Communist world.

The new leaders in the Kremlin now profess penitence for the misdeeds of the criminal Stalin. It should be remembered that Stalin's greatest crimes were committed not against the Russian people but against neighboring free people, particularly Poland, who were enslaved by force of Russian arms and have been kept in subjection by violence and electoral fraud.

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The Kremlin confessions regarding Stalin's activities constitute new evidence justifying the reopening of the Polish case of 1945.

Surely there is some international organization which will support the principle of free and properly supervised elections in Poland.

The Poznan uprising proves—if any further proof were needed—that there are still Poles who are willing to sacrifice their lives for their nation.

The free world should not sit on the sideline while the unctuously penitent men in the Kremlin proceed to repeat Stalin's crimes of 1945 and apply the jackboot to Poland once again.

We must protest against Communist methods and develop our protest into an effective demand for free elections in Poland.

Meanwhile the press and radio of the world should not relax its efforts to expose the administrative and judicial terror being employed against the Polish people.

We should demand the fullest and most factual account of the happening, and if press correspondents are denied freedom of movement in Poland and freedom of access to the accused, the world should know about it and protest accordingly.

The methods adopted by the Communist authorities in Poznan throw a lurid light on the insincerity of the Kremlin much advertised change of heart.

WENTWORTHSY.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 12, 1956.

HON. JAMES O. EASTLAND,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR EASTLAND: Thank you very much for your letter of July 5, enclosing a copy of a cable sent by 12 members of the Australian Parliamentary Affairs Committee, as well as a copy of your letter to Senator George.

Both of these enclosures will be called to the attention of appropriate officers in the Department.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ ROBERT C. HILL,
Assistant Secretary
(For the Secretary of State).

(The following letter from Chairman Eastland to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and a reply from Theodore C. Streibert, Director of the United States Information Agency, were ordered into the record at the subcommittee meeting on July 18, 1956.)

JULY 2, 1956.

HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On June 29, 1956, Seweryn Bialer testified before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in connection with the recent riots in Poznan, Poland. As you know, Mr. Bialer was, until January 31 of this year, a member of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party, specializing in anti-Western and anti-American propaganda.

Enclosed herewith, for your information, is a copy of the transcript of Mr. Bialer's testimony, setting forth important evidence concerning recent events in Poland. As his testimony shows, the Polish Communist leaders have been forced to permit a certain liberalization of conditions; and it is this, he states, which unleashed the forces that caused the Poznan uprising.

I particularly call your attention to the following colloquy near the close of Mr. Bialer's testimony (pp. 3413-3415):

"MR. MORRIS. Mr. Bialer, could you tell us what you feel the United States policies would be now with respect to this expressed desire on the part of the Polish people to gain their liberation from control?

"MR. BIALER. First of all, sir, I believe that the most important thing in this field is this: Let the American people convince the Polish people first that they sympathize with them; and secondly, that the Americans will never reconcile themselves with the loss of freedom in Poland.

"MR. MORRIS. Let the American people know that they sympathize with the Polish people and that they will never reconcile themselves to the loss of freedom on the part of the Polish people?

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"Mr. BIALER. Let the Polish people know it.

"Mr. MORRIS. Let the Polish people know that the Americans sympathize with their feeling that they will never reconcile themselves to the loss of their freedom?

"Mr. BIALER. I want to stress very, very strongly this fact. The Polish Communist Party and the Polish Communist regime are doing everything possible to silence the Western world and the Americans, not to let them—to stop them—saying the truth about the situation in Poland.

"Mr. MORRIS. The Communist leaders are doing everything possible in order to cause the leaders of the West and the people of the West not to express themselves on these subjects?

"Mr. BIALER. Yes; to such a degree that I would put it in such a slogan—it amounts to this: The Communist leaders in Poland are saying to the Western world, very smartly, very cleverly, 'Don't you criticize us in your radios and we will not jam your broadcasts.'

"Mr. MORRIS. Should we continue to criticize them?

"Mr. BIALER. Naturally, if we stop the campaign of criticizing them and revealing the truth, this would mean a great help to them in their oppression of the Polish people.

"Mr. MORRIS. And therefore, that is—a policy which would cause us to soften our criticism of the Polish overlords would be a bad policy for us to pursue?

"Mr. BIALER. I think that such a policy would be a very terrible policy as far as the Polish people are concerned, and in consequence would be a bad policy for the United States."

I have taken the liberty of setting forth this particular portion of Mr. Bialer's testimony, because I believe it sheds important light upon an issue of policy concerning which there has been a great deal of debate in recent months.

On all sides we hear it said nowadays, that America should take the lead in relaxing international tensions, as a means of promoting the goal of world peace. To this end, it has been suggested that the United States should modify the tone of its broadcasts to the captive nations of Eastern Europe, to avoid giving any possible offense to the Communist overlords of those areas. Mr. Bialer's testimony serves to emphasize how ill-advised such a course would be, and what dreadful consequences it might have, both for the Polish people and for the United States.

I therefore express the hope, Mr. Secretary, that nothing will deter this country from speaking with fearless candor to the oppressed populations behind the Iron Curtain. Only from us can they hear the truth, and only the truth can make them free.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES O. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.

JULY 11, 1956.

DEAR SENATOR EASTLAND: Thank you for sending me a copy of the letter which you sent to the Secretary of State on July 2, 1956, concerning part of Seweryn Bialer's testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. As you may know, the United States Information Agency has made extensive use of interviews with Mr. Bialer.

With regard to the colloquy in which Mr. Bialer advised the American people to convince the Polish people that Americans sympathize with them and will never reconcile themselves to loss of freedom in Poland, I can assure you that the Agency endeavors to exploit all suitable opportunities to emphasize these points. The following are typical of the numerous applicable statements that are being broadcast to Iron Curtain countries:

"* * * May 3 is the day on which this country and the people of Poland renew a mutual faith in freedom, and in the strong bonds of friendship and common purpose which unite us across all the barriers the Iron Curtain imposes"—Department of State statement on Polish Constitution Day.

"* * * The peaceful liberation of the captive peoples has been, is and, until success is achieved, will continue to be a major goal of United States foreign policy"—White House statement.

"* * * We believe that all free peoples will be watching the situation closely to see whether or not the Polish people will be allowed a government which will remedy the grievances which have brought them to a breaking point"—Department of State statement on the Poznan demonstrations.

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Since your letter to the Secretary of State also mentions the Poznan uprising, I think you would be interested in knowing that the Agency's treatment of this subject highlights sympathetic reaction from the United States and elsewhere.

Our treatment has also been drawing upon the heavy flow of eyewitness accounts, news reports, and commentaries that (1) show the uprising as a manifestation of legitimate grievances arising from conditions that are typical of East European regimes, (2) interpret the uprising as an act of desperation stemming from privations while the U. S. S. R. and the satellites are making grandiose offers of aid to nonbloc countries, (3) offer more evidence that the satellite regimes constitute dictatorial minority rule, and (4) again underline the importance of permitting all people to enjoy the right to live under governments of their own choosing.

I believe these lines, which are being applied to a familiar current development, accord fully with the points brought out in the aforementioned colloquy.

I can also assure you that the policy of the Agency calls for a consistent, vigorous presentation of the truth to the captive peoples of Eastern Europe. This policy will continue. The determinant factors in the tone and content of the Agency's output to these peoples are the attainment of national policy objectives of the United States and the means considered most likely to be productive for this purpose.

Sincerely yours,

THEODORE C. STREIBERT, *Director*.

(The following article by Jay Lovestone, published in the AFL-CIO American Federationist of August 1956, was ordered into the public record:)

CAN COMMUNIST PARTIES BE "INDEPENDENT FROM MOSCOW"?

(By Jay Lovestone,¹ executive secretary, free trade union committee, AFL-CIO)

There is very little that is spontaneous or genuine about the June 24, 1956, statement by Communist Party of the United States declaring its "independence from Moscow." This is a synthetic declaration ordered by Moscow. Under instructions of Moscow, the British, Italian, and French Communist Parties and Europe's No. 1 fellow traveler, Pietro Nenni, have also made such declarations. Other Communist Parties have since then done likewise.

Quite naturally, one is tempted to ask: How can Moscow order supposedly independent parties functioning in other countries what to do? And why should Moscow resort to such a weird way of doing things?

These questions appear baffling to many in the free world because they tend to apply to Communist Parties the yardsticks and standards they employ in judging organizations which are political parties in the democratic sense of the word.

No Communist Party is a political party in this sense. It is, therefore, necessary, first of all, to examine the particular nature, the specific character, the peculiar features that distinguish the Communist Parties from other political parties in the free world.

The overriding and overwhelming preeminence of the Russian section of the international Communist movement has always been accepted by all other Communist Parties and their fellow travelers. This is understandable. After all, the Russian Communists, led by Lenin, were the first to triumph in their revolution. This victory, the progress achieved in Soviet consolidation, and the Kremlin's increasingly important role in the international area have given the Russian Communists immeasurable authority and prestige among Communists and their followers throughout the world.

For these reasons it has become almost second nature for Communists outside of the Soviet Union to echo and copy everything which the clique that happens to be dominant in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union says or does. For years, Communist parties everywhere have oriented themselves and behaved as auxiliaries of the already victorious Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Secondly, the dominant leader, or the ruling clique, of the Soviet Communist Party, at any particular moment, has always insisted on, and exploited, such

¹ Jay Lovestone was formerly secretary of the Communist Party in the United States. In 1929 he was expelled for fighting against Stalinism and has since then become one of the leading fighters against communism of every hue and stripe.

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behavior of the Communist parties outside the Soviet borders for its own factional advantage and interests. As Russian Communist factional struggles became more violent and destructive, as inner party groups were defeated and annihilated, as the base of leadership in the Soviet Communist Party narrowed, this exploitation of the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union for enhancing the Kremlin's ruling clique interests became established Comintern practice and policy.

Thus, in 1929, the leadership of the American Communist Party, which had the overwhelming support of the organization in the United States, was purged by Stalin himself. This Russian purge of the organization in the United States came primarily because these leaders were suspected of being sympathetic to Bukharin, then the principal ideological opponent of Stalin.

After Stalin thus drove thousands of members out of the Communist Party of the United States, he went on to foist upon it a general secretary and other leaders who were his supine henchmen. The latter hastened to hail all the programs Stalin subsequently launched against his opponents in the Soviet Communist Party and throughout the Comintern. The other sections of the Comintern lost no time in imitating and copying the hooliganism of Stalin by mass party expulsions and drastic purges.

After years of devastating faction struggles inside the Soviet Communist Party, it became a party of robots—a party of total political automation. Only Stalin and the small clique of yes-men around him counted. Stalin fully understood what this robotization meant for the functioning, future behavior, and inner life of the Soviet Communist Party. That is why he had the 17th Party Congress (March 1939) abolish the mass purge. Once ideological differences, discussions, and groups were no longer possible inside the Soviet Communist Party, the mass purge of hundreds of thousands of Communist Party members and millions of so-called kulaks was entirely unnecessary.

Thus had the mass purge "outlived its historical usefulness." It had even begun to engulf Stalin's closest collaborators and to threaten the very physical existence of the Communist Party.

Under conditions in which narrow cliques or power-mad individuals replaced ideological groups, the rulers of the Bolshevik Party found it necessary to have a different sort of purge—the purge of picked and strategically placed followers of a particularly ambitious individual leader whom Stalin or his immediate entourage feared. This is the difference between the Khrushchev purge of Beria and his henchmen and Stalin's mass purges of numerous ideological supporters of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Bukharin in the Bolshevik ranks.

Between Bukharin and Stalin and between Trotsky and Stalin there were very important political and ideological differences. But between Khrushchev and Malenkov or Molotov and between Khrushchev and Beria there were no serious ideological differences. Theirs was primarily a clash over the amassing of power—actually a stage in the conflict over who is to succeed Stalin as the omnipotent and omniscient party dictator.

This is the inevitable logic of internal organization development in all totalitarian parties. This is especially true for a Communist Party which directs an ironclad dictatorship over the people in every walk of life and human endeavor.

In this connection, it is necessary to note that, under the very cover of paying continuous and loud lipservice to the principle of collective party leadership, Stalin grabbed total power for himself. While proclaiming loyalty to this "principle," Stalin eliminated physically every potential political opponent of his, everyone who might conceivably be able to have an idea of his own or demonstrate sufficient courage to work and fight for his convictions.

Today Khrushchev is following faithfully this Stalin pattern of elimination of leaders and gradual concentration of power in his own hands. Here we have the key to the political demotion and humiliation of Malenkov and Molotov and the most recent "retirement" of Kaganovich from active life in the Soviet Party and Government. Here we have the why and wherefore of Khrushchev's ordering the execution of Beria and his closest colleagues.

While this transformation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was going on, the other Communist parties were also being changed in their composition and character, in their anatomy and physiology, in their structure and functioning. They also became parties of blind and mechanical followers. They also hardly attracted any critical-minded individuals.

They became primarily paramilitary outfits organized to execute Kremlin commands and to make shifts of Communist Party line quickly and with least loss of members, regardless of how sharp the turn was.

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Only Communist Parties thus molded could weather as they did the shift brought into painful relief by the Stalin-Hitler pact and the present anti-Stalin campaign. Only organizations hammered into such shape and malleability could hail the Stalin-Hitler pact which led to World War II as a great service to world peace. This explains why and how the Communist Parties throughout the world—which had for years boasted about their militant antifascism—could commend Nazi Germany as a force for peace and condemn the allied democracies as warmongers and aggressors.

In the same spirit and for the same reason, the Communists in the United States and other democracies tried to sabotage armament production. They sought to help the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis with which their Soviet "paradise" was then pact-bound. This is what the Communists did—until Hitler forced Stalin to change his line by attacking him.

This process of political automation which has been going on for years inside the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was mechanically and rigidly carried over by Stalin into all other Communist Parties. The Communist Party of every country was transformed completely into a puppet outfit slavishly and mechanically supporting all Soviet foreign and domestic policies.

Thus were the internal cliques, intrigues, and conflicts afflicting the Soviet Communist Party mechanically transplanted into and automatically reflected inside every other Communist Party. Every non-Russian party leadership was soon turned into a rubberstamp of the dominant ruler of the Communist Party outside the Soviet Union, of the international Communist movement as a whole.

When Stalin decided during World War II to liquidate the Comintern, the very ones who were its top functionaries and titular leaders did not know about the Kremlin ukase ordering the end of their organization. They learned about the "demise" only after they had read its "death" notice in Pravda.

In view of this total political automation, it was not so difficult for the very ones whom Stalin had put into the "leadership" of the various Communist parties to denounce him as a murderer, sex pervert, and arsonist—once the clique controlling the Soviet Communist Party turned on Stalin. The "leaderships" of the other Communist parties almost automatically and with very few exceptions followed the same course of denouncing Stalin, whom they had for many years sycophantically hailed as a supergod.

This fantastic turnabout and repudiation of themselves was not very difficult for those with years of experience in echoing, aping, and supporting the policies and maneuvers of whoever happened to rule the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at any moment.

It is very instructive to note that all the Communist parties outside of the Soviet Union not only fell in line with the denunciations of Stalin as a demon. They fell in line with equal precision in supporting the entire international strategical and tactical line laid down for world communism by the 20th Congress (co-existence, united and popular fronts, different roads to "socialism," etc.). This habit of automatic reflection of Soviet Communist Party life and regimen has become a cardinal characteristic, sort of second nature, for Communist organizations throughout the world.

It is this inherent feature of Communist (Leninist-Stalinist) organizational structure and functioning that accounts for the speed, skill, and shamelessness with which the Communist parties outside the U. S. S. R.—the puppets and dependents of the present Kremlin regime—are now carrying out the instructions from Moscow to proclaim their "independence" from Moscow.

The very manner, the very timing, the whole international sequence and chorus of this proclamation of "independence" only demonstrate anew the brazenness and cynicism of the real rulers of world communism. The very occasion for and manner of these Communist parties proclaiming their "independence from Moscow" provide crushing confirmation of how hopelessly dependent these organizations are on whatever clique happens to be dominant in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Obviously, their dependence has taken on a sort of "new look." However different the countenance of this dependence may appear, its contents are essentially unchanged.

The "declaration of independence" is not so new. After all, once the Comintern was declared dissolved, every Communist Party was "on its own" and, therefore, "independent." The relations between every Communist party and Moscow—under such circumstances—could be only bilateral. This is exactly the relationship that the latest Communist Party of the United States declaration proposes to have with the Soviet Communist Party and other Com-

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munist parties. Other Communist parties have already followed with the same proposal.

Here we must note that several Comintern officers, who have since broken with Moscow, have disclosed that, in spite of the formal dissolution of the Comintern, an international Communist organization did continue to function under the direction of the Kremlin. So history will repeat itself after the more recent dissolution of the Cominform, which covered only a limited area.

Contradictory? Confusing? Weird? Well, let Lenin himself explain this "mystery," this flexibility and duplicity of Communist tactics, this readiness on the part of Communists to turn somersault, to lie, to resort to all sorts of frauds, to wallow in the mud in order to build their most cherished instrument—the party which is their engine of subversion and destruction of democracy.

Said Lenin:

"It is necessary to be able to * * * agree to any and every sacrifice, and even— if need be—to resort to all sorts of stratagems, maneuvers, and illegal methods, to evasion and subterfuge in order to penetrate the trade unions, to remain in them and to carry on Communist work in them at all costs. * * * Of course, in Western Europe, which is particularly saturated with inveterate legalist, constitutionalist, bourgeois-democratic prejudices, it is more difficult to carry on such work. But it can and must be carried on, and carried on systematically." (Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder, pp. 95-96.)

Soviet imperialist interests and the interests of the present dominant clique in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union demand that the peoples of the Soviet Empire should believe that there is something really new and better about the post-Stalin regime. These interests demand that the outside world, the non-Soviet world, particularly the Western democracies and the labor movements of the free world, should believe that the Soviet "new look" is something genuinely different, something truly new and better.

Why is this so? Stalin's domestic and foreign policies had already exhausted their usefulness even before the 19th Soviet Communist Party Congress, held in October 1952. Stalin himself had begun to recognize that his political and his organization technique had run their course both at home and abroad. Such recognition by Stalin was reflected in the decisions of the 19th Party Congress.

The roots of the present Khrushchev strategy and tactics and the basis of the current Soviet domestic and foreign policies are to be found in the line laid down by Stalin himself at and for the 19th Soviet Communist Party Congress. What is really new in the U. S. S. R. since this congress is that the Khrushchev leadership—which was created by Stalin—is now trying to avoid all blame and condemnation by the Soviet peoples and the outside world for the disastrous moral, political, and economic consequences of Stalinism.

The Khrushchev leadership continues to be loyal to the fundamental political and organization principles of Leninism-Stalinism—that is, to totalitarian communism and its goal of world domination. But the Khrushchev leadership is realistic enough to know that it must rely on new methods and different tactics in order to revitalize and improve the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which is its engine of total power over the economic, military, political, and cultural life of the Soviet Empire.

No one should seek to deny or even belittle the significance of the changes which they are making inside the U. S. S. R. and throughout the international Communist movement. But these changes are being made by Khrushchev and his clique solely to strengthen their grip on the Soviet Communist Party, to bolster the position of the Soviet Union in the current critical international situation.

These changes aim to modernize and streamline the machinery of the world Communist movement so as to enable it to carry out all the more effectively the new line of the 20th Communist Congress—the line of greater infiltration and penetration, more extensive subversion and the conquest of the free trade unions, social democratic parties, and other labor organizations in the free world.

Significant as these changes are, they do not prove that Khrushchev and his collected leadership are moving toward liberalism and taking steps which will lead even slowly yet surely to the replacement of aggressive Communist totalitarian dictatorship with a democratic system of government dedicated to living in peace with all other nations.

Khrushchev and his aids realize that the new times call for a new approach. They realize that the new tasks demand that Communist parties drop their old methods of work, break with their former practically open avowal of loyal sub-

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servience to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to the Soviet Government which it controls. Here we have one of the principal reasons for the maneuver of pretended and pretentious "independence from Moscow" now being made by all Communist parties.

But it would be a mistake to consider this formal and noisy disavowal of dependence on and subservience to Moscow as only a maneuver—as merely formal compliance with orders from Moscow. It is all that, but it is also much more. Even more important than the Moscow-dictated maneuver itself is the reason for the Kremlin making it at this time. In this instance, the why of the action is even more important than the significant action itself.

The Khrushchev leadership is compelled to make this sweeping maneuver in the ranks of world communism for basically the same reason which impelled it to resort to the denigration of Stalin. The Kremlin ruling clique is trying to preserve the essence and substance of Stalinism within the U. S. S. R. and throughout world communism, while seeking to blur or disown its crudest and most obviously repulsive features.

Decades of bestiality, political depravity, moral degradation and human enslavement have revealed the hideous nature of Soviet and world communism, its degrading organization and its reprehensible methods of functioning. These dark decades have produced a soil fertile for the seeds of disintegration of international communism as an ideology, as a universal philosophy, as a Weltanschauung.

Khrushchev and his aids are fully aware of this. They are trying to check this trend toward the disintegration of communism as an ideology of enchantment or an avenue of escape by making certain superficial and surface changes in their methods of rule and leadership, in their strategy and tactics, in their control of the Communist parties outside the U. S. S. R. They are doing this in order to preserve and promote the overriding aim of communism which, under Khrushchev no less than under Lenin or Stalin, remains the conquest of the world and its transformation along the lines of the Soviet pattern.

We cannot warn too strongly against confusing the moral and political corrosion of communism as an ideology with the corrosion of the Communist dictatorship as a political power system. The two are related. But they are not identical. There are elements of serious disintegration in communism as an ideology. But, at this moment, there are no important signs of disintegration of communism as a political power system within the Soviet Union or in any of its satellites.

The ruthlessness and dispatch with which the Warsaw puppet regime recently crushed the revolt of the Poznan workers for bread and freedom show that Moscow continues to control the machinery of the world Communist conspiracy. Moscow continues to inspire, direct, and finance this worldwide subversive conspiracy and fifth-column apparatus.

But in this control Moscow is bound to face new and serious complications and difficulties. We must never forget that, though all Communists and Communist parties continue to owe their first loyalty to the Soviet dictatorship, they are, especially in the Western democracies, also subjected to the influence of other forces.

The effects of Communist ideological disintegration cannot be helpful to the Communist political power system. However, the Communist power system can be used effectively to counteract the manifestations of ideological disintegration. Khrushchev is now using very effectively his giant political power system for this purpose. In this the top boss of Soviet and world communism has been greatly helped by two factors: (1) the failure of the free world to exploit the moral and political bankruptcy of communism as an ideology, and (2) the readiness of too many in the free world to swallow the Soviet "new look," hook, line and sinker.

The move to have each Communist party publicly proclaim its "independence" from Moscow is calculated to eradicate, or at least to halt, the trend toward the disintegration of communism as an ideology. It is easier for a robotized Communist outfit which proclaims its being "free from Russian control" to serve the interests of Soviet foreign policy and enhance the prestige of the Kremlin rulers than for an outfit that can be easily labeled "made in Moscow."

To prove their "independence," all Communist parties will, henceforth, be permitted, upon specific instructions from their masters in Moscow, to "differ" from and "criticize" certain particular Soviet actions. This move seeks also to allay the discontent and the dismay which undoubtedly existed in the various Communist parties, especially after the Khrushchev revelations about Stalin.

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However, as long as their parties are Leninist, Communist, they will never disavow the basic aims of communism. They will never oppose or even question the fundamental interests and basic line of the totalitarian Soviet Government. They will never dilute their essential primacy of loyalty to the Soviet ruling party and its dominant clique.

Moscow is taking a calculated risk in this audacious maneuver. Some "comrades" in the free world will fall by the wayside. The recruiting of new members will certainly be slowed down in this area. For a while recruitment may even be brought to a grinding halt. But since the Communist Party is essentially a paramilitary cadre organization, it can afford such a halt for a period of time.

Through this new "independence from Moscow" line, the Kremlin aims to facilitate the Communist development of united and popular front strategy and tactics. Through these tactics Moscow's Communists hope to gain new and fresh recruits from Socialist, labor, and liberal ranks.

Moscow is sure that the winning of such recruits and the success of the popular front policy will soon again bring Communists into the cabinets of western governments. Moscow is confident that the "independent" Communist parties will find it easier at least to lead these governments toward much less suspicion or even to far greater faith in the Khrushchev regime.

The naive attitude of French Foreign Minister Pineau toward the Khrushchev regime now at the helm of Soviet imperialism, the loose talk in Washington and London about Moscow's readiness to remove the sources and causes of world tension, the deliberate weakening of NATO and their own military forces by some western powers all confirm the marked success which the Kremlin has already had in hoodwinking western statesmanship. The latter has, unfortunately, shown a terrific capacity for wishful thinking.

To permit the various foreign appendages of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to talk about or, in a limited sense, even to act their "independence" from Moscow is a very small price for the Kremlin to pay—if, in return, it should be able to plant its fifth columnists and dupes in important posts in western democratic and neutralist governments.

Indeed, this is a very small price to pay for making it easier for the Communist parties and their followers to soften and undermine the will and the determination of the free world to reject and resist the basic aims of Soviet communism—the fundamental, aggressive, totalitarian aims which have not been dropped or even modified in the least.

In this light, it is not hard to understand the sudden "moral" awakening of Nenni—leader of the pro-Soviet Italian Socialist Party—about political degradation in the Soviet Union. In this light, it is easy to understand Nenni's dissatisfaction with the way the Kremlin has of late been mauling Stalin, who had been his guide, guardian, and benefactor for years. But the world has still to hear a single word from Nenni as to when he will break his pact of common action with Khrushchev's agency in Italy—the Communist Party headed by Togliatti.

We have yet to hear from Nenni, from Foster (titular head of the Communist Party in the United States), from Togliatti, from the French Communist boss Thorez and from the Chinese Mao Tse-tung a demand that the Kremlin should correct and atone for the crimes it perpetrated under Stalin's guidance against the captive peoples of Europe and Asia.

We have yet to hear from these servants of the Kremlin a single word of repudiation and condemnation of the germ warfare charges leveled by the Moscow-Peking Axis against the United States.

Of course, if and when Khrushchev should press a button and give the Communist Party automatons in the United States the order to do so, his fifth column in our country will surely respond. Only then will the Daily Worker have enough "independence" to denounce as a Stalinist fraud the Moscow-Peking germ warfare charges against our country.

As long as this world Communist regime and relationships continue, all talk about the Communist Party in the United States or any other Communist Party being independent from Moscow is just plain nonsense. As long as these parties remain Communist in aim and character, they will continue to function as dependents, as auxiliaries, as agencies of their parent body, the Communist Party of "Holy Mother Russia."

Only when such organizations or individuals disown and break with the principles and practices of totalitarian communism, only when they are no longer

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Communists, only when they fight actively against the pernicious Communist evil can they stop being instruments of Moscow in intent or content, in aim or action.

It might be said that the Tito experience proves that there can be going Communist concerns which are independent of Moscow. It is rather significant that, today, Moscow is especially interested in promoting this illusion. Why? Because Tito has a very important role to perform for Moscow in advancing the Soviet's new line of penetration and subversion of the Social Democrats, neutralists, and even some bona fide free trade-union organizations.

Let us look into this Tito myth a bit farther. It took nearly a billion dollars worth of American military aid—plus untold other western aid, comfort, and confidence—to keep the Tito Communist regime alive. Tito's Communist dictatorship could never have survived without this unstinting "capitalist" generosity. Moreover, as soon as Moscow began to change its tactics—not its principles and aims—Tito began a sweeping rapprochement with the Soviet Government in the arena of international diplomacy and also with the Communist Party and the Soviet political police apparatus.

Obviously, Yugoslavia cannot dominate or direct the Soviet Union's foreign or domestic course. Khrushchev may have formally apologized to Tito for "Stalin's crimes;" but, in return, Tito has actually and actively aligned himself with the Khrushchev regime in support of all its important foreign policies and in hailing the Soviet "new look."

These foreign policies aim to preserve the loot seized—under Stalin's leadership—for Soviet imperialism. These Soviet foreign policies seek to promote the drive for Communist world domination. The hub of a Communist world empire would be Moscow, not Belgrade. Its hero, or its Fuehrer, would be a Khrushchev, not a Tito.

In view of all these changes and bewildering maneuvers by the Soviet rulers of world communism, it is very important to keep in mind that neither Lenin, nor Stalin, nor Khrushchev is individually or collectively solely to blame for the inhuman savagery, the moral degradation, and the physical and intellectual enslavement suffered by countless millions behind the Iron Curtain.

Of course, no one should seek to absolve these criminals and paranoids of any guilt for their bestial crimes. But as criminals they are the products, the most powerful specimens and most noxious weeds, of communism as a totalitarian system and ideology. Stalin and the present Khrushchev leadership which he created and trained are certainly criminal desperadoes. But the Communist system which breeds and rears such criminal types as the rulers and leaders of its society is even more horribly criminal.

Lenins and Stalins may come and go. Khrushchevs may rise and fall. But as long as the Communist system continues, new and perhaps more dangerous and even more depraved criminals are bound to take their place in perpetrating the blackest crimes against the Soviet peoples and all humanity.

Those in the United States or anywhere else who continue to have faith in dictatorship, in totalitarianism, in the Soviet Union as an historically progressive and humanely beneficial system, in the fundamental aims of communism, can never be truly independent of Moscow—either as individuals or as organized bodies and parties.

As long as these people or parties remain loyal to the basic aims of Soviet communism or continue to place their faith in the principles of totalitarian communism, they cannot be anything else but apostles, agents, and agencies of totalitarian dictatorship—instruments of deceit, brutality, and aggression.

No matter how loudly or how often such individuals or organizations may shout about their "independence from Moscow," they will remain prisoners of a horrible power and a morally degrading faith whose seat and center, whose head and heart are in Moscow.

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NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the names of an individual or an organization in this index.

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